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ENDA BEFORE IT STARTS: SECTION 5 OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMffiNT AND 
THE AVAILABILI1Y OF DAMAGES AWARDS 
TO GAY STATE EMPLOYEES UNDER THE 
PROPOSED EMPLOYMENT NON-
DISCRIMINATION ACT 
WILLIAM D. ARAIZA * 
Abstract: The United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Board 
of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett further circumscribed 
Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's 
recent decisions in this area insist that enforcement legislation be 
congruent and proportional to the constitutional violations sought to 
be remedied. The specter of reduced leeway for congressional 
enforcement authority requires Congress to approach such federal 
legislation carefully. The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA), 
proposed legislation prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in 
employment, provides an interesting case study of the Court's recent 
Section 5 jurisprudence. This Article, after outlining historic and 
current Section 5 standards, uses Garrett as a guide to examine whether 
the Supreme Court would uphold ENDA's provision allowing state 
employees to sue their employers for certain types of retrospective 
relief. The Article both argues that ENDA is a valid expression of 
Congress' Section 5 power and provides strategies for navigating the 
increasingly narrow confines of Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power to provide critical employment protections. 
In February 2001, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, l holding that Ti-
tle I of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)2 exceeded Con-
* Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author wishes to thank Cath-
erine Fisk, Evan Gerstmann, Eve Hill, David Leonard, and Georgene Vairo for reading and 
commenting on earlier drafts of this Article and David Clifford for fine research assistance. 
1121 S. Ct. 955 (2001). 
242 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (1990). The ADA prohibits employment discrimination 
against the disabled. 
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gress' power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.3 Garrett marked 
a continuation of the Court's recent practice of closely scrutinizing 
federal legislation based on Congress' power to enforce the Four-
teenth Amendment, the so-called "Section 5 power."4 This line of 
cases,5 most decided by the same 5-4 majority,6 represents a sustained 
attempt by the Court to circumscribe what had previously been Con-
gress' extremely broad enforcement power, reviewed deferentially by 
courts.7 The cases all feature the Court's new insistence that such en-
forcement legislation demonstrate "congruence and proportionality" 
to the constitutional violations sought to be remedied.s In turn, those 
violations must either appear likely to the Court (because, for exam-
3 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: 'The Congress shall have the power 
to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. 
XN,§5. 
4 See id.; see, e.g., infra note 5 and accompanying text. 
S See generally Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coil. Sav. Bank v. Fla. 
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense. Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of Boerne v. Flores, 
521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
6 The exception was the first case in the series, City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507-66. The 
majority in City of Boerne included Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy (the author), 
Justice Thomas, and, for most of the opinion,Justice Scalia. These four Justices have been 
members of the five:Justice majority in the other recent Section 5 cases. See, e.g., Fla. Pre-
paid, 527 U.S. at 629. The fifth member of that group, Justice O'Connor, dissented in City 
of Boerne, although she agreed with the majority's Section 5 analysis. See 521 U.S. at 544, 
545 (O'Connor, j., dissenting). The City of Boerne majority also included Justices Stevens 
and Ginsburg, both of whom have dissented in subsequent Section 5 cases. See id. at 510; 
see also, e.g., Coil. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691-94. The line-up in City of Boerne was skewed by 
the Justices' disagreement over the proper standard for analyzing the underlying right that 
Congress was purporting to enforce, the Free Exercise Clause, as incorporated against the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. 
7 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (holding that the proper 
standard for reviewing a congressional assertion of its Section 5 authority is whether the 
Court could perceive a basis for Congress' decision that enforcement of the Fourteenth 
Amendment would be furthered by the challenged statute); id. at 653 (stating that the 
scope of Congress' discretion under the Section 5 power was as broad as that under the 
Commerce Clause and other Article I grants of authority when combined with the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966) (using 
the same analysis for Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment). The Court 
has indicated that the inquiry is the same for Congress' powers to enforce both the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 
955, 967 n.8 (2001); Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (noting the identity of the tests involving the 
congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments and Congress' 
Article I powers); see also James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 558-59 (1924) 
(employing the same analysis for Congress' power to enforce the Eighteenth Amend-
ment). 
8 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 81; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 639; City of 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
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pIe, they involve discrimination on some disfavored ground such as 
race) or because Congress has revealed a pattern and practice of un-
constitutional conduct by the states.9 
While these cases all point in the same direction with regard to 
the reduced leeway the Court now gives such legislation, each case 
deals with the vindication of a right that has a different type and level 
of grounding in the Constitution.1° City of Boerne v. Floresll dealt with 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).12 RFRA attempted to 
protect religious freedom, a highly protected right explicitly en-
shrined in the Constitution and incorporated against the states via the 
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.13 RFRA attempted to 
undo the effects of a then-recent Supreme Court decision that 
identified a lower level of scrutiny as appropriate for free exercise 
claims.14 The Court struck RFRA down, concluding that the statute 
was simply an attempt to reinterpret the Constitution rather than pro-
tect values the Court had identified in its free exercise jurispru-
dence.15 
Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank also considered a statute 
guarding against state deprivations of a due process right, the prop-
erty right in a patent.16 In that case, the Court struck the statute down 
because Congress had not demonstrated a pattern of unconstitutional 
conductjust:ifYing the statutory remedy.1' The companion case, College 
Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid, considered whether the Lanham Act's 
9 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 964; Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88-89; Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640; City of 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32. 
10 See, e.g., Kimel, 528 U.s. at 62; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507. 
11 521 U.S. at 507. 
1242 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). 
13 See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940); see also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 
at 519. 
14 In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 
882, 883 (1990), the Court significantly reduced the scope of the protection granted relig-
ious expression under the Free Exercise Clause, holding that a generally applicable law 
that incidentally burdened religious expression would be subjected only to a very deferen-
tial test. In so doing, the Court rejected the test approach set fortlI in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 
U.S. 398 (1963), in which the Court subjected such laws to strict scrutiny, to tlIe extent 
they substantially burdened religious expression. RFRA attempted to overturn the result in 
Smith by mandating tlIe strict scrutiny test (narrowly tailored to meet a compelling gov-
ernment interest) before state and local governments could take actions tlIat substantially 
burdened religious expression. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1. 
15 See infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in City 
of Boerne). 
16 527 U.S. 627,630 (1999). 
17 See infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text (discussing tlIe Court's analysis in FInr-
ida Prepaid) . 
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prohibition on false advertising bestowed on competitors of the al-
leged false advertiser a property right to be free from such unfair 
competition.IS The Court rejected the argument that such a right ex-
isted in the Due Process Clause and thus concluded that the false ad-
vertising prohibition was not "appropriate" Section 5 legislation. 19 
Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents dealt with age discrimination, a 
claim made under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.2o However, the Court has held that age classifications 
are subject only to the lowest level of equal protection scrutiny-the 
well-known "rational basis" test-and has never struck down an age 
classification.21 As Congress did not demonstrate actual instances of 
state age-related employment discrimination that would rise to the 
level of constitutional violations, the Court held that the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act's (ADEA) application to the states 
exceeded Congress' Section 5 authority.22 
Garrett completes the set of cases, as it deals with a right, an equal 
protection-based right against disability-based employment discrimi-
nation, that again receives only rational basis scrutiny.23 Unlike age 
discrimination, however, disability discrimination (at least mental dis-
ability discrimination) has been found unconstitutional by the Court 
in one case, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center.24 While Cleburne 
has apparently not heralded a new day of heightened judicial solici-
tude for the rights of the disabled, mentally or otherwise,25 there is at 
least precedent on the books for finding such discrimination uncon-
stitutional. Nevertheless, as in Kimel, the Garrett Court held that Con-
gress had not found sufficient evidence of states' unconstitutional 
conduct justifying the broad prohibitions in the statute and struck 
18 526 U.S. 666, 675 (1999). 
19 See id. at 672-75. 
20 See grneraUy 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
21 See Kime~ 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991». See grner-
ally Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 
(1976) (per curiam). 
22 See infra notes 93-103 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in 
Kimel). 
23 121 S. Ct. 955, 963, 964 (2000); see, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 442-46 (1985) (rejecting the application of heightened scrutiny to discrimina-
tion based on mental disability). 
24 473 U.S. at 432. 
25 See Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321-28 (1993) (upholding a statute that 
treated persons with mental retardation less favorably than those with mental illness). 
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down application to the states of the Americans with Disabilities Act's 
(ADA) employment provisions.26 
With the basic doctrine in place (the "congruence and propor-
tionality" standard, the requirement that actual unconstitutional con-
duct be identified or at least obvious, and, more generally, stricter ju-
dicial scrutiny), and with examples of its application to the different 
types of rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment,27 eyes 
should now turn to mapping the terrain of future challenges to Sec-
tion 5 legislation. The proposed federal ban on employment dis-
crimination based on sexual orientation presents an interesting Sec-
tion 5 question. Such proposed legislation (in recent years entitled 
the Employment Non-Discrimination Act, or "ENDA"), has been in-
troduced in Congress every year since 199428 and has gathered more 
support each time.29 While the attitude of the Bush administration is 
unclear,30 there is at least a possibility that the bill will be enacted in 
the next several years. 31 Such a law would almost assuredly be consti-
tutional as an expression of Congress' commerce power, even after 
the Court's recent retrenchments in this area.32 As such, it could also 
26 See infra notes 104-127 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's analysis in 
Garrett). 
27 Obviously this is an oversimplification. Still, the basic outlines are now present: City 
of Boerne considered a fundamental due process right; College Savings Bank considered a 
right that was too tenuously linked to constitutionally protected "property" interests to be 
protected by the Due Process Clause; Kimel considered an equal protection argument that 
the Court had consistently rejected; and, Garrett considered one that the Court normally 
rejected, but had on one occasion accepted. See generally Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. 
Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Coll. Sav. 
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). The situation tlle Court has not addressed since City 
of Boerne is legislation addressing an equal protection classification (such as gender or 
race) in which the Court has required application of strict judicial scrutiny. 
28 ENDAwas introduced in the 103d Congress. SeeH.R. 4636, 103d Congo (1994). 
29 See, e.g., infra note 31 and accompanying text. 
30 The Republican Platform states that "we do not believe sexual preference should be 
given special legal protection or standing in law." Republican Platform 2000, Renewing 
America s Pmpose Together (2000), at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/conventions/ 
republican/features/platform.00/#19 (last visited Nov. 30, 2001). 
31 ENDA was first introduced in the 103d Congress on June 23, 1994 and has been re-
introduced every year since in at least one house. Most years the bill has died in commit-
tee; however, in 1996 the bill received its first floor vote and came within one vote of pas-
sage in the Senate. OnJuly 31,2001, the bill was reintroduced. As of September 28, 2001, 
the bill had forty-three co-sponsors in the Senate and 184 in the House, with members of 
both political parties serving as cosponsors. 
32 See United States V. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610 (2000) (striking down 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981 (1994) as exceeding Congress' power under the Commerce Clause, but noting 
that the commerce power allows Congress to enact laws regulating activities that substan-
6 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 22:1 
constitutionally be applied to the states, under the authority of Garcia 
v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority.33 The issue, analogous to 
those raised in Kimel and Garrett, would be whether plaintiffs (in this 
case, lesbian and gay state employees) could sue their state/employer 
for retrospective relief such as a damages award.34 Such retrospective 
relief against a state cannot be authorized pursuant to a statute 
justified as an expression of Congress' Article I powers.35 Thus, in or-
der for such employees to collect damages, the statute would have to 
be supportable as an expression of Congress' Section 5 power.36 
Thus, the question: Would ENDA be an appropriate enforcement 
statute under current Supreme Court doctrine? Part I of this Article 
examines the Supreme Court's Section 5 jurisprudence, paying spe-
cial attention to the recent line of cases beginning with City of Boerne. 
Part II of this Article applies the Court's current approach to Section 
5 legislation to the versions of ENDA introduced in recent congres-
sional sessions.37 It is clear that the current approach requires an ex-
amination of the suspicion with which the Court has regarded the 
underlying conduct being restricted. Applying that test to ENDA will 
require examining how seriously the Court is concerned about dis-
tially affect interstate commerce and determining that the "substantial effects" test author-
izes regulation of economic activity that in the aggregate substantially affects interstate 
commerce); Unites States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 559-60 (1995) (striking down the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1990, but noting the same congressional power as explained in 
Morrison). 
33 See 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985) (holding that generally applicable laws can be con-
stitutionallyapplied to the states in their capacity as participants in the national economy). 
The recent "anti-commandeering" cases do not disturb that result; they are more con-
cerned with federal attempts to control the states in their capacities as governments. Com-
pare generally Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (striking down federal attempt to 
direct a state's law enforcement operations) and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992) (striking down federal attempts to direct a state's legislative agenda) with Reno v. 
Condon, 526 U.S. 1111 (1999) (upholding a statute regulating the commerce in driver's 
license information, as it did not require the states to regulate their citizens in any particu-
larway). 
S4 Compare Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 417 (1975) (holding back pay 
to be an integral part of the "primary objective" of Title VII) . 
35 See generally Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Indeed, the Court 
has also held that Article I does not empower Congress to make states suable for retrospec-
tive reliefin their own courts. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 406, 430-31 (1999). 
36 See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (holding that Section 5 gives 
Congress the power to abrogate state immunity from suits seeking retrospective relief). 
37 SeeS. 1284, 107th Congo § 501 (2001); S. 1276, 106th Congo (1999); H.R. 2355, 106th 
Congo (1999); H.R. 1858, 105th Congo (1999); S. 869, 105th Congo (1997); S. 2238, 103d 
Congo (1994). Because ENDA is not yet law, this Article will cite from different versions of 
ENDA, suggesting the implications if an ultimately enacted ENDA statute contained or 
lacked that particular type of provision. 
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crimination against gays and lesbians. This, in turn, leads us to con-
sider Romer v. Evans.38 The task here will be to attempt to "translate" 
Romerinto Section 5 language, much as the Court in Garrett attempted 
to translate Cleburne.39 Mter considering whether Romer means that all 
sexual orientation discrimination in employment is constitutionally 
irrational, and reaching an equivocal conclusion, Part II continues by 
examining whether ENDA is sufficiently limited so as to prohibit only 
that discrimination which the Court would in fact consider unconsti-
tutional. Assuming that ENDA does in fact go beyond what the Con-
stitution commands, Part II concludes by considering whether ENDA 
constitutes appropriate prophylactic legislation, perhaps going be-
yond what equal protection requires but sufficiently related to those 
limits as to satisfy the Court's test of "congruence and proportional-
ity." Part III of this Article takes a more prescriptive tone. Since ENDA 
has not yet been enacted, its proponents in Congress may well wish to 
consider Garrett and the other Section 5 cases as they draft new ver-
sions of the bill. Part III offers some unsolicited advice for those in-
terested in ENDA's enactment, suggesting ways in which the bill's 
drafting, and especially its fact-finding, may maximize chances for its 
survival as an appropriate expression of Congress' Section 5 power. In 
Part IV, the Article concludes by offering some general thoughts on 
the Court's recent Section 5 jurisprudence, based on the results of the 
foregoing analysis of ENDA as legislation designed to ensure the 
equal protection rights of gay men and lesbians.40 
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S SECTION 5 JURISPRUDENCE 
A. The Court's Section 5 Jurisprudence Before City of Boerne 
The history of the modern Court's interpretation of the Section 
5 power is a familiar one and will be recounted only briefly here. In 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, the Court upheld as a valid exercise of the Sec-
3B 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996) (striking down Amendment 2, a Colorado constitu-
tional provision prohibiting the state or its subdivisions from banning discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation). 
39 See Bd. ofTr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 963-64 (2001). 
40 For convenience, this Article uses the term "homosexual" and "gay" interchangably, 
to denote gay, lesbian, or bisexual status or conduct (depending on the context). The 
analysis in this Article does not purport to address the employment rights of transgen-
dered people as those rights might be protected by the Constitution, ENDA, or extant 
federal antidiscrimination law, most notably Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
prohibits discrimination based on sex. 
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tion 5 power a provision of the Voting Rights Act that allowed gradu-
ates of the sixth grade of accredited Spanish-language schools in 
Puerto Rico to vote, notwithstanding state English-literacy 
qualification tests.41 Even though the Court had previously held that 
such literacy tests did not violate the Equal Protection Clause,42 the 
Court concluded that the statute was an appropriate use of Congress' 
Section 5 power.43 Writing for a five-member mcyority, Justice Brennan 
enunciated an extremely deferential test for Section 5 legislation. 
Quoting directly from McCulloch v. Maryland, the Court held that the 
scope of the Section 5 power was governed by the same broad test ap-
plicable to exercises of Congress' Article I power: '''Let the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means 
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which 
are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the consti-
tution, are constitutional."'44 In a case decided the same year as 
Morgan, the Court had enunciated that same standard as governing 
the scope of Congress' analogous power to enforce the Fifteenth 
Amendment.45 
Turning to the merits, the Court put forth two justifications for 
upholding the statute. First, providing voting rights for Puerto Ricans 
might be thought to assist in ensuring equal responsiveness to their 
concerns from the political process.46 Second, and more controver-
sially, the Court stated that Congress may reasonably have thought 
that the English literacy test itself violated the Equal Protection 
Clause, despite what the Court had itself held several years before.47 
This potentially revolutionary grant of interpretive power to Congress 
elicited a sharp dissent from Justice Harlan48 and has been controver-
sial ever since.49 Still, Morgan laid the foundation for two principles of 
41 384 U.S 641,652 (1966). 
42 See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1959). 
43 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966). 
44 Id. at 650 (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 4 Wheat. 316, 421 (1819»; see 
also id. ("By including section five the draftsmen sought to grant to Congress, by a specific 
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in 
the Necessary and Proper Clause."). 
45 See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326 (1966); see also Morgan, 384 U.S. 
at 651 (citing South Carolina for the McCulloch proposition) . 
46 See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652-53. 
47 See id. at 653-56. 
48 Seeid. at 659, 668-70 (Harlan,]., dissenting). 
49 See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 259-64 (1983) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) 
(arguing that application of the Age Discrimination Employment Act to state employers 
was authorized by neither the Commerce Clause nor as a provision enforcing Section 5 of 
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the Court's Section 5 jurisprudence: deferential review of the appro-
priateness of Section 5 legislation and a broad conception of what the 
Section 5 power allows Congress to do. 
Retrenchment was quick in coming. Four years later, in Oregon v. 
Mitchell, a severely fractured Court was unable to agree on a rationale 
for upholding Congress' decision to lower the voting age to eighteen 
in federal elections, while striking down Congress' decision to do the 
same with regard to state elections. 50 Justice Black, the fifth vote for 
both of these holdings, tied his Section 5 analysis to the existence of 
other textual authority for Congress to act in this area.51 Thus, as 
other parts of the Constitution gave Congress the power to regulate 
elections for federal offices,52 Justice Black concluded that Congress 
had greater power under Section 5 to go beyond what he saw as the 
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments' overriding concern with race 
discrimination.53 By contrast, he was not willing to grant Congress 
such broad power under its authority to "enforce" the Fourteenth or 
Fifteenth Amendments when it was acting in an area not directly ad-
dressed by those provisions. 54 Justice Harlan, writing for himself only, 
would have struck the statute down as applied to both federal and 
state elections.55 He agreed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
address the issue of voting rights56 and questioned Morgan's deferen-
tial standard for reviewing Section 5 enactments.57 Justice Stewart, 
joined by two other Justices, also would have struck down both appli-
cations ofthe statute.58 He agreed with Justice Black that the Constitu-
tion gave the states the authority to regulate elections and refused to 
the Fourteenth Amendment and specifically critiquing the theory that Congress can ex-
pand Fourteenth Amendment rights via Section 5); Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional 
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 106 (1966) (describing 
this rationale as "a strikingly novel form of judicial deference to congressional power"). 
50 See generally 400 U.S. 112 (1970). Other voting access provisions were upheld by 
larger majorities in this case. 
51 See generally id. 
52 Seeid. at 119-24 (opinion ofBlack,j.). 
53 Seeid. at 126-30 (opinion ofBlack,j.). 
54 Seeid. at 130 (opinion ofBlack,j.). 
55 See Oregon, 400 U.S. at 152 (Harlan,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
56 See id. at 152, 200 (Harlan,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 212, 
213 (Harlan,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (concluding that the only pos-
sible Section 5 justification for the statute lay in the possibility that states were engaged in 
invidious discrimination against 18-to-21 year-olds and rejecting that argument). 
57 See id. at 152, 204-09 (Harlan,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
58Id. at 281 (Stewart,j., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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give Morgan a broad reading.59 Thus, in Oregon, five Justices ques-
tioned the scope of the Section 5 power as construed in Morgan.6o 
Nevertheless, Oregon remains a weak precedent given its fractured na-
ture and the special circumstances of the case, namely, Articles I and 
II's arguably clear delegation of the election regulation power to the 
states and the explicit conclusion of at least two Justices that the Four-
teenth Amendment simply had nothing to say about age-based dis-
crimination in voting.61 
Ten years after Oregon, the Court in City of Rome v. United States 
upheld Congress' power under the enforcement provision of the Fif-
teenth Amendment to prohibit changes in state election laws that had 
either the purpose or the effect of diluting black voting strength.62 
The same day the Court decided City of Rome, it also held that state 
action, in order to violate the Fifteenth Amendment, had to evince 
purposeful discrimination.63 In allowing Congress to prohibit a prac-
tice the Court had just held to be constitutional, the City of Rome 
Court reasoned that Congress might have found that disparate impact 
suggested discriminatory intent but that such intent might be difficult 
to prove.64 Thus, according to the Court, Congress had the power to 
craft a prophylactic rule-what Laurence Tribe has described as "al-
most a rule of evidence"65-that prohibited electoral changes with 
racially disparate impact because so many of those changes might 
59 See id. at 281, 285-92, 294, 296 (Stewart,]., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (viewing Morgan as giving congressional power under Section 5 "the furthest possible 
legitimate reach ") . 
60 See id. at 112. Other commentators disagree, finding in Oregon an implicit 
reaffirmation of Morgan's broad power. See, e.g., Bonnie I. Robin-Vergeer, Disposing of Red 
Herrings: A Defense of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 69 S. CAL. L. REv. 589, 718-23 
(1996). 
61 See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text; see also supra note 58 and accompany-
ing text. Justice Brennan, the author of Morgan, wrote in Oregon for himself and two other 
Justices and would have upheld the statute's application to both federal and state elec-
tions. See Oregon, 400 U.S. at 229 (Brennan,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
He characterized Morgan as resting on the superior fact finding capabilities of Congress 
when compared with those of the judiciary. See id. at 248-50 (Brennan,]., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas would also have upheld the statute in its en-
tirety. See id. at 135 (Douglas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). He also relied 
on Morgan and would have applied that case's deferential standard of review to Congress' 
decision that lowering the voting age was appropriate in order to secure equal protection. 
See id. at 141-44 (Douglas,]., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
62 See generally City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980). 
63 See generally City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
64 See City oflWme, 446 U.S. at 177 (1980). 
65 See LAURENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw §§ 5-14, at 338 (2d ed. 
1988). 
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have been motivated by racial discriminatory intent.66 This rationale 
can be understood as a ''wider net" theory, in which a wider net of 
conduct might be prohibited than that which was actually unconstitu-
tional in order to be sure to catch all actual constitutional violations. 
According to the City of Rome Court, such a rationale derived naturally 
from Congress' power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment.67 
Thus, in 1997 when the Court decided City of Boerne v. Flores it 
had before it a tradition of broad readings of Congress' enforcement 
power. Morgan had been the high-water mark, with its intimation that 
Congress had the power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.68 
But even leaving that particular holding aside, the general standard of 
deference enunciated in Morgan and South Carolina v. Katzenbach, and 
the wider net concept endorsed in City of Rnme, all pointed to congres-
sional power to go beyond the actual guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment when crafting remedial or deterrent legislation and 
broad discretion to decide on the need for such legislation. City of 
Boerne, however, ushered in a new era.69 
B. The Change Wrought lty City of Boerne 
Starting with City of Boerne, the Court began to cut back on the 
deference it had previously given to Congress' decisions to use its Sec-
tion 5 power.70 In City of Boerne, the Court struck down RFRA, which 
purported to enforce the Due Process Clause's guarantee of free relig-
ious expression, incorporated from the Free Exercise Clause of the 
First Amendment.71 RFRA accomplished this by prohibiting state and 
local governments from substantially burdening religious exercise, 
even via a generally applicable law that did not single out religious 
expression, unless the burden was justifiable under the strict scrutiny 
test of narrow tailoring and a compelling government interest.72 The 
strict scrutiny test imposed by RFRA was similar to the Court's own 
66 See City ofRnme, 446 u.s. at 117. 
67 See 446 U.S. at 173-78. It bears repeating that the Court has consistently viewed the 
enforcement provisions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to be identical, 
except of course for the subject matter to which such enforcement legislation can be ad-
dressed. See cases cited supra note 7. 
68 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). 
69 See discussion infra Part J.B. 
70 See generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
71 Seeid. at 519. 
72 See id. at 515 (discussing 42 U .S.C. § 2000bb-l (1994». 
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rule for deciding free exercise cases between 1963 and 1990, when it 
replaced it with a test that was much less demanding.73 
In striking down RFRA, the Court enunciated principles that it 
has since applied several times when deciding the scope of the Sec-
tion 5 power. Most importantly, the Court required, for the first time, 
that legislation defended as an exercise of the Section 5 power reflect 
a "congruence and proportionality between the injury to be pre-
vented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. "74 The Court 
held that RFRA failed this test.75 First, in discussing congruence,76 it 
concluded that the legislative record revealed no examples of laws 
enacted because of religious bigotry, which the Court identified as the 
basic evil sought to be prevented by the Free Exercise Clause." The 
record did reveal examples of laws burdening religious exercise, but 
these were only tangential to the value the Court had identified in the 
Free Exercise Clause and thus the value Congress was authorized to 
protect through its Section 5 power.78 The Court also held that RFRA 
was not proportional to any violations that might exist, since it was not 
the case that many actions thereby prohibited would have been un-
constitutional. 79 Thus, the Court distinguished RFRA from statutes 
such as the Voting Rights Act, which was upheld in cases such as City of 
Rome on the "wider net" theory discussed above.8o Given this lack of 
proportionality, the City of Boerne Court concluded that RFRA was 
75 Indeed, the Court saw in RFRA an attempt to move the law even beyond the Court's 
pre-Smith jurisprudence, as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), toward an 
even more accommodating attitude toward religion. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 535 
(RFRA "imposes in every case a least restrictive means requirement-a requirement that 
was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codifY."). See generally Em-
ployment Div., Dep't. of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). With re-
spect to the less demanding test, see, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 872. A fuller explanation of 
the Smith Court's analysis and rejection of Sherbert's strict scrutiny test is provided in City of 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 512-16. 
74 City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 520. 
75 Id. at 530-34. 
76 This Article will not focus on the distinction, whatever it may be, between the "con-
gruence" and "proportionality" requirements. As will become clear, both requirements 
speak. to the same basic concern about the fit between the statute's limits on state action 
and the constitutional violation it seeks to remedy. 
77 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-32, 535. 
78 See id. at 531. 
79 See id. at 532. 
80 Seeid. at 530-32; City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 117, 177 (1980); ThIBE, 
supra note 65. 
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simply an attempt to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment, not to 
enforce it.81 
Thus, City of Boerne establishes several points about the Court's 
modern Section 5 jurisprudence. Most basically, that jurisprudence 
entails much more careful judicial scrutiny than previously needed. In 
particular, the Court now requires some measure of fit between statu-
tory means and the constitutional violations supplying their underly-
ing rationale. This fit must include at least some evidence of violations 
of the underlying constitutional right. For example, in City of Boerne 
the Court noted that Congress did not find examples of states engag-
ing in religious bigotry (the underlying value in the Free Exercise 
Clause, at least under Employment Division, Department of Human Re-
sources of Oregon v. Smith).82 This "fit" requirement also seems to de-
mand at least some rationale for the scope of the remedial statute that 
is linked to violations of the underlying right. In City of Boerne, the 
Court noted that most practices outlawed by RFRA would probably be 
constitutional and thus criticized the statute for sweeping too 
broadly.83 These two sides of the "fit" requirement are closely related, 
of course: If the statute addressed an area where there was little evi-
dence of unconstitutional conduct, it would follow that the statute 
would also be overly broad in relation to those underlying violations. 
C. Florida Prepaid and Kimel: Variations on the Theme 
In Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank and Kimel v. Florida Board 
of Regents, the Court reaffirmed the approach it crafted in City of 
Boerne.84 The circumstances of each case, however, led the Court to 
apply that approach in slightly different ways. 
81 See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 533, 534 (stating, after discussing the stringency of the 
strict scrutiny standard codified in RFRA, that "[wle make these observations not to rear-
gue the position of the majority in Smith [against using strict scrutiny in this areal but to 
illustrate the substantive alteration of its holding attempted by RFRA"). 
82 See id. at 530, 531. 
83 See id. at 532. 
84 College Savings Bank, while also rejecting Section 5 as a valid basis for the challenged 
statute, was decided on an issue preliminary to the City of Boerne analysis. See generally Coli. 
Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627 (1999); City of 
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). In College Savings Bank, the Court held that the Lanham Act's 
prohibition on false advertising did not give businesses a property right in avoiding the 
unfair competition such false advertising might cause. See 527 U.S. at 673. Because there 
was no property interest, and thus no right under the Due Process Clause, the Court did 
not have to consider whether the statute was an appropriate means for enforcing such a 
right. See id. at 675. In the same term the Court decided Kime~ it also decided United States 
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), in which it held, inter alia, that the federal Violence 
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1. Florida Prepaid 
The issue in Florida Prepaid was Congress' amendment to federal 
patent law, making states liable for infringement suits.85 The Court 
held that the law was not an appropriate use of Congress' Section 5 
power.86 The Court made explicit what it had suggested in City of 
Boerne; namely, that Section 5 requires Congress both to identify the 
conduct actually violating the Fourteenth Amendment (in this case, 
the Due Process Clause) and to tailor its legislative scheme to remedy-
ing or preventing such violations.87 Applying these requirements, the 
Court in Florida Prepaid concluded that Congress had failed to identify 
such violations, which the Court defined as not just patent infringe-
ments, but patent infringements that deprived the patent holder of 
propertyB8 without due process.89 Examining the record, the Court 
concluded that "Congress appears to have enacted [the statute] in 
response to a handful of instances of state patent infringement that 
do not necessarily violate the Constitution. ''90 The Court also found 
fault with the proportionality of the statute, concluding that it was not 
tailored to focus on unconstitutional conduct, but instead made states 
liable whenever they infringed on a patent, regardless of, for example, 
whether the infringement was merely negligent (and thus not a "dep-
rivation" of property) or whether the state provided remedies for dep-
rivations (and thus did not fail to provide "due process").91 Tellingly, 
the Court distinguished earlier precedent, namely, South Carolina, on 
the ground that the statute upheld in that case did include various 
Against Women Act (VAWA) did not constitute appropriate remedial legislation under 
Section 5. VAWA provided the victim of a gender-based crime of violence a private right of 
action against her attacker. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). In holding that the statute was not 
appropriate Section 5 legislation, the Court concluded that it failed the congruence and 
proportionality test because it was directed not at state action, but at the action of private 
parties (the attackers). See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 625-26. Because VAWA directed the rem-
edy towards private parties, and the statutes in City of Boerne, Kimel, Flmida Prepaid, Garrett, 
and ENDA itself proscribe a remedy directed at the state actor, Morrison is of very limited 
relevance. For this reason, this Article will not discuss Morrison any further. 
85 See generally 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
86 Id. at 647. 
87 See id. at 639. 
88 The Court held that mere negligent infringement did not constitute, for due proc-
ess purposes, a "deprivation" of the "property" that is a patent. See id. at 645. 
89 See id. at 640-43. 
90 Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 645-46; see also id. at 647 (,The examples of States avoiding 
sovereign immunity in a federal-court patent action are scarce enough [in the historical 
record], but any plausible argument that such action on the part of the State deprived 
patentees of property and left them without a remedy under state law is scarcer still."). 
91 See id. at 646-47. 
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limits and thus was proportional to the violations it attempted to rem-
edy.92 
2. Kimel 
Kimel, decided in 2000, was the first case after City of Boerne in 
which the Court faced a statute that implicated the Court's three-
tiered, class-based analysis under the Equal Protection Clause.93 In 
Kimel, a state challenged the Section 5 authority for the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act (ADEA) .94 Again applying the "congru-
ence and proportionality" requirements to strike down the law, the 
Court began by noting that age classifications challenged as violations 
of equal protection receive only rational basis review.95 Indeed, the 
Court noted that it had never concluded that a state's age discrimina-
tion violated the Equal Protection Clause.96 Given its reluctance to 
strike down such discrimination, the Court concluded that applica-
tion of the ADEA to the states violated the proportionality require-
ment.97 
But the fact that age discrimination receives only rational basis 
review by the Court, with the Court having rejected every such age 
discrimination claim it heard, did not mean the end of the case. In-
stead, the Court at least considered the plaintiffs' argument that limi-
tations on ADEA liability meant that the statute prohibited only age 
discrimination that was so unreasonable as to be unconstitutionally 
irrational or at least so unreasonable such that the statute could be 
considered proportional to the underlying constitutional violation.98 
The Court rejected this argument, concluding that the ADEA's excep-
tions and limitations were sufficiently narrow such that the statute did 
in fact prohibit a broad swath of conduct that would survive rational 
basis scrutiny in a constitutional challenge.99 The Court's rejection of 
the plaintiff's argument, however, is less important than the fact that 
they considered it serious enough to warrant several pages of statu-
tory analysis. Such consideration suggests that the Court seems to 
have recognized that conduct could still theoretically be unconstitu-
92 See id. at 647 (citing City oj Boerne's discussion of City oj Rome) . 
93 See generally 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
94 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1994); 528 U.S. 62, 66, 67 (2000). 
95 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-86. 
96 See id. at 83. 
97 See id. at 86. 
98 See id. 
99 See id. at 86-89. 
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tional and thus appropriately proscribable by Congress acting pursu-
ant to Section 5, even if it was judged only under the rational basis 
standard.loo 
Finally, the Court considered the possibility that the ADEA's ap-
plicability to the states might have been justified as a response to a 
"difficult" or "intractable" problem,lol The Court seems here to be 
indicating that unconstitutional age discrimination might be a serious 
problem, difficult to prove, or otherwise impervious to correction, 
thus requiring an aggressive legislative response. In considering that 
possibility, the Court examined the legislative record to determine 
whether there was in fact a significant problem with states engaging in 
unconstitutional age discrimination.102 Reviewing the legislative rec-
ord for examples of such discrimination engaged in by states, the 
Court concluded that the record did not reveal such a problem, dis-
missing the plaintiffs' evidence of congressional concern about age 
discrimination by state government as "isolated sentences clipped 
from floor debates and legislative reports. "103 
Thus, in Kimel, the Court presented the situation as one combin-
ing a deferential judicial review standard for age discrimination with a 
broad-based legislative prohibition on such discrimination unaccom-
panied by evidence that Congress perceived a significant problem 
with state government age discrimination. This picture strongly sug-
gested that the Court would be skeptical of any Section 5 legislation 
addressing discrimination against groups that do not receive height-
ened judicial protection, at least in the absence of significant legisla-
tive evidence that a constitutional problem does in fact exist. Before 
that suggestion could solidify, however, the Court had to confront one 
additional fact pattern. 
100 See Kime~ 528 U.S. at 8~9 
101 Id. at 88; see also Fla. Prepaid Post Secondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 
527 U.S. 627, 646 (1999) ("Though the lack of support in the legislative record is not de-
terminative ... identifying the targeted constitutional wrong or evil is still a critical part of 
our Section 5 calculus because 'strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be 
an unwarranted response to another, lesser one.'") (quoting City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 527, 530 (1997». 
102 Kime~ 528 U.S. at 89. 
103 Id.; see also id. at 90 (describing the record as being "assorted sentences ... cob-
ble[d] together"). 
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D. Garrett and the Problem of Cleburne 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett completes the 
set of general situations the Court could face when confronting a Sec-
tion 5 statute.104 In Garrett, the Court, by the same 5-4 majority that 
decided Kimel and Florida Prepaid, struck down the application of Title 
I of the ADA to the states, to the extent that statute authorized private 
party lawsuits seeking damages against states that had not consented 
to federal jurisdiction.105 Applying the congruence and proportional-
ity test, Chief Justice Rehnquist began by noting that state discrimina-
tion against the disabled was subject only to the rational basis stan-
dard, which allowed the disabled to be treated differently if there 
were any rational reason for doing so.106 So far, this was no different 
from the analysis in Kimel, which noted that the same deferential re-
view applied to age classifications.107 But in Garrett, the Court con-
fronted a challenge beyond that faced in Kimel. Unlike age 
classifications, the Court had at least once struck down an instance of 
disability discrimination as failing the rational basis standard. lOS Thus, 
while the lack of suspect class status (and the attendant heightened 
review) may have made it very difficult for Congress to justifY legisla-
tion benefiting that group, the Court in Garrett had to confront the 
fact that on at least one occasion, it had found discrimination against 
the group to be so unreasonable as to fail the rational basis test. The 
question then arose: Given that the Court itself had found such un-
constitutional discrimination against the group, would not application 
ofthe ADA to the states "enforce" against such discrimination? 
The majority's response to this proposition, however, was not en-
couraging. While it noted and reaffirmed City of Cleburne v. Cleburne 
Living Center's conclusion that negative attitudes or fears alone could 
not justifY government action, the Court in Garrett described its hold-
ing in Cleburne as resting on standard rational basis review, as opposed 
to the less deferential type of review commentators (and other mem-
104 As noted above, this statement is something of an oversimplification but still essen-
tially accurate. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
105 See Bd. of Tr. of the Unviv. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967, 968 (2001). Pre-
sumably, the Court would also prohibit such a lawsuit against an unconsenting state in 
state court, given the result in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that general 
principles of state sovereign immunity prevent Congress from authorizing private party 
lawsuits for retrospective relief against unconsenting states in state court when the federal 
law is based on an Article I power). 
106 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963-64. 
107 See 528 U.S. at 83. 
lOB See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 449, 450 (1985). 
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bers of the Court) had seen in Cleburne.109 By reading Cleburne as the 
exceptional situation where standard rational basis review required 
that a statute be struck down, the Court laid the foundation for con-
cluding that there was no pattern and practice of such unusually irra-
tional discrimination. In turn, that conclusion led it to hold that the 
ADA was not congruent and proportional to such violations that did 
exist and thus was invalid as Section 5 legislation. 
Again, as in Kimel, the Court considered the evidence Congress 
had marshaled regarding the constitutional problem posed by disabil-
ity discrimination. llo In examining the legislative record, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist started by severely limiting the scope of the data it was will-
ing to consider.lll In particular, the Court insisted on excluding not 
just examples of private discrimination but also discrimination per-
formed by units of local governments, on the theory that such units 
did not enjoy the protection of the Eleventh Amendment and thus 
could be sued for retrospective relief without Congress having to use 
its Section 5 authority.ll2 
Turning to actual examples of state government discrimination 
against the disabled, the Court noted that the record included exam-
ples of "half a dozen" instances of state government discrimination. ll3 
It found these instances to be insufficient, observing that it was not 
clear whether those acts of discrimination were unconstitutionally ir-
rational.1l4 The Court noted that Congress had failed to make a for-
mal legislative finding that states were acting unconstitutionally and 
similarly failed to state such a conclusion in the committee reports on 
the ADA.ll5 It also noted that accounts of state discrimination against 
the disabled cited in Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion were submit-
ted not directly to Congress, but to the Task Force on the Rights and 
109 Compare Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963 n.4 (describing Cleburne as based on "the basic 
principles of rationality review"), with, e.g., Richard B. Saphire, Equal Protection, Rational 
Basis Review, and the Impact of Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 88 Ky. L. REv. 591, 607-16 
(1999-2000) (discussing the Court's approach in Cleburne and concluding that the major-
ity applied a test more stringent than the normal rational basis review), and Cleburne, 473 
U.S. at 459 (Marshall,]., concurring in the result and dissenting in part). 
JlO See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-66. 
111 See id. at 965. 
112 Id. 
m [d. The Court cited, among others, a state university's refusal to hire a person be-
cause of his blindness and a state agency's firing of an employee because of his epilepsy. See 
id. at 965. 
Jl4 &e Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965. 
115 &e id. at 965-66. 
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Empowerment of Americans With Disabilities, which had also failed 
to make findings about unconstitutional conduct by the states.116 
Moving on to the actual content of the ADA, the Court con-
cluded that the statute's provisions went beyond what was required 
under the rational basis standard, rendering the ADA a dispropor-
tionate response to whatever constitutional problem may exist.ll7 It 
noted that the ADA required employers to make "reasonable accom-
modations" for disabled individuals otherwise able to perform their 
jobs11S and concluded that failure to provide those accommodations 
might be perfectly rational, though cruel-in the Court's words, 
"hardheaded" though perhaps "hardhearted. "119 The Court found 
similar problems with other provisions of the ADA, including its plac-
ing of the burden on the employer to show that a requested accom-
modation would constitute an undue burden (and thus not required 
under the statute) 120 and its prohibition of standards that had a dispa-
rate impact on the disabled.121 According to the majority, these provi-
sions, like the "reasonable accommodation" requirement, went be-
yond what the Constitution required, all in the context of an area 
where the Court was unconvinced that Congress had demonstrated 
the existence of a constitutional problem. 
The Court concluded by comparing the ADA, once again,122 with 
the provisions of the Voting Rights Act upheld in South Carolina.123 
The Court described those provisions as a "detailed but limited reme-
dial scheme" applicable "in those areas of the Nation where abundant 
evidence of States' systematic denial of [constitutional voting] rights 
was identified. "124 It pointed to the careful examination of the issue 
that Congress undertook before enacting the Voting Rights Act and to 
116 See id. at 966. 
117 See id. 
118 See id. at 966-67 (citing the ADA). 
119 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964; see also id. at 966-67 (stating that "it would be entirely 
rational (and therefore constitutional)" for a state to refuse to make the "reasonable ac-
commodation [s 1 " required by the ADA). 
120 See id. at 967. 
121 See id. (comparing the ADA's disparate impact test with the constitutional test for 
equal protection, which requires discriminatory intent, citing Washington v. Davis, 446 u.s. 
229,239 (1976». 
122 See supra note 92 and accompanying text (citing City of Boernes and FWrida Prepairfs 
comparison of the statutes those cases struck down with the statute upheld in South Caro-
lina). 
125 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 967. 
124Id. 
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its documentation of "a marked pattern of unconstitutional action by 
the States. "125 
Concurring, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor, lauded 
the purposes of the ADA, but suggested that state violations of the 
ADA might not have their base in "embod[iments of] the miscon-
ceived or malicious perceptions of some of their citizens. "126 He noted 
that allegations of unconstitutional disability discrimination had not 
been made to federal or state courts and agreed with the Court that 
Congress had also failed to supply such a record.127 
E. The Current Law of Section 5 
Mter City of Boerne, Florida Prepaid, Kimel, and Garrett, certain 
propositions about Congress' Section 5 power seem clear. First, the 
Court is shying away from the idea expressed in Morgan that Section 5 
authorizes Congress to engage in its own interpretation of the Four-
teenth Amendment and that congressional interpretation is owed 
deference by the Court.128 Second, Morgan's general level of defer-
ence to Congress' Section 5 authority-expressed as McCulloch's 
broad formulation of judicial deference to legislative judgments con-
cerning the need for and breadth of Article Ijustified regulation-
may be less secure, in light of both the Court's careful review 
regarding whether constitutional violations exist that justify Section 5 
legislation and its requirement that such legislation be limited in 
scope so as to correspond to the constitutional violation it seeks to 
address.129 The recent cases' consistent references to South Carolina 
and their descriptions of the Voting Rights Act provisions upheld in 
that case as carefully limited suggest as much.130 
The Court has also indicated that it will closely scrutinize statutes 
benefiting groups that do not enjoy heightened judicial protection 
under the Equal Protection Clause. This seems true even if, as in 
1ll5Id. 
126 Id. at 968 (Kennedy,]., concurring). 
127Id. (Kennedy,]., concurring). 
128 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 u.s. 507, 527-29 (1997). 
129 Compare e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (scrutinizing the legis-
lative record to determine whether Congress had found a pattern of unconstitutional state 
discrimination against the elderly), with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-56 
(1966) (asking if Congress' likely conclusions were reasonable) . 
130 See Bd. ofTr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967 (2001); City of Boerne, 
521 U.S. at 532-33; see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. CoD. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647 (1999) (citing the City of Boerne discussion of the limited nature of 
the Voting Rights Act's provisions). 
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Garrett, the statute benefited a group that the Court had found in the 
past to have been the victim of unconstitutionally irrational discrimi-
nation.m Again, this close scrutiny will entail an examination of 
whether the scope of the statute is limited in a way corresponding to 
the constitutional violations found. I32 On the other hand, the Court 
has continued to endorse the "wider net" theory of cases like City of 
IWme, allowing Congress to prohibit broader swaths of conduct than 
would be forbidden under the Fourteenth Amendment itself as long 
as there is a sufficient factual record supporting the need for the 
broader legislation.I33 The Court has also continued to insist that it 
respects Congress' determinations about what is needed to guarantee 
Fourteenth Amendment rightS.I34 
As a rough description, then, the current Court requires Con-
gress to do more by way of fact-finding before it will uphold statutes as 
valid uses of the Section 5 power. The Court also requires Congress to 
take more care to limit legislation so as to correspond more closely to 
the constitutional violations it seeks to address. In essence, the careful 
review the Court now gives to Section 5 legislation shifts the presump-
tion away from Congress, requiring it, rather than the state, to make 
out a case for its use of that power.I35 The next part of this Article ap-
plies these observations to ENDA in an attempt to determine whether 
the Court would uphold its applicability to the states as appropriate 
Section 5 legislation. 
II. GARRETT, ROMER, AND ENDA 
At first glance, it might appear that Board of Trustees of the Univer-
sity of Alabama v. Garrett sounds the death knell for any authorization 
151 &e Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 963-64. 
m See, e.g., id. at 967 (comparing the Voting Rights Act provisions upheld in South 
Carolina, described as "a detailed but limited remedial scheme" applicable in parts of the 
country where Congress identified "abundant evidence of States' systematic denial" of 
constitutional rights, with the ADA, which it described as a "comprehensive national man-
date for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities") (quoting 
ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (b) (1) (1994». 
m See, e.g., Kime~ 528 U.S. at 81; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518. 
1M See, e.g., Kime~ 528 U.S. at 81; City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536. 
1!15 Compare Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection By Law: Federal Antidis-
crimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 477 (2000) (describing 
the Court's current review of Section 5 legislation as "strict scrutiny"). It is unclear whether 
such a de facto shift in the burden of proof applies also to legislation targeting discrimina-
tion on the basis of criteria the Court always considers suspect, most notably race and gen-
der. The Court has not decided a case considering such a statute in the post-City of Boerne 
period. 
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in ENDA for state employees to sue their employers for retrospective 
relief.136 In both Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and Garrett, the Court 
was quite skeptical of the Section 5 basis for federal legislation 
benefiting groups that the Court had not previously favored with sus-
pect class status. Garrett further suggests that an occasional decision 
striking down a statute harming a particular group, on the ground 
that the statute failed the rational basis test, would not be of much 
help in saving a Section 5-based statute benefiting that group. This 
latter fact makes it even more doubtful that the Court would find 
ENDA an appropriate enforcement of the constitutional rights found 
to be violated in Romer v. Evans137 given that decision's well-known 
ambiguity.138 
This part of the Article considers the constitutionality of ENDA as 
Section 5 legislation. It starts by summarizing ENDA's most important 
provisions. It then identifies and describes the constitutional violation 
resulting when a state engages in employment discrimination against 
gay men and lesbians. The Article then considers whether there is a 
pattern of such violations and then asks whether ENDA is directly tar-
geted at those violations or, if not, whether it is a congruent and pro-
portional response to them. 
A. ENDA 
ENDA's basic provisions are straightforward.139 ENDA would 
make it unlawful "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individ-
ual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to 
the compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment of 
the individual, because of such individual's sexual orientation."l40 
This terminology tracks closely the anti-discrimination language in 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment 
136 Versions of ENDA introduced in the past have clearly intended to bring states 
within their purview in their capacity as employers. For example, S. 1276, introduced in 
the 106th Congress, explicitly abrogates state sovereign immunity. Section 13(a) provides 
for remedies at law to the extent available under Title VII, S. 1276 § 13(b) and defines 
"employer" to include "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce (as defined in 
section 701 (h) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e(h» who has 15 or more 
employees"), S. 1276 § 3(3) (A). 
137 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
138 See infra notes 160-163 and accompanying text. 
139 S. 1284, 107th Congo (2001); H.R. 2692, 107th Congo (2001). Unless noted other-
wise, citations in this section are to the House and Senate versions of the bill introduced 
into the 107th Congress. 
140 S. 1284; H.R. 2692. 
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discrimination on the basis of race or gender.141 In an important con-
trast to Title VII, however, ENDA does not allow an employee to make 
out a discrimination claim based on an employment practice that has 
a disparate impact relative to sexual orientation.142 ENDA explicitly 
waives state sovereign immunity143 and provides for retrospective re-
lief, although, importantly, it does not allow for back pay awards as a 
component of compensatory damages. l44 ENDA also includes a num-
ber of other important limitations. In addition to the prohibition on 
back pay awards, ENDA limits relief by barring courts, as part of a re-
lief order, from ordering quotas or preferential treatment for gays.145 
141 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (2001) (prohibiting same activity when per-
formed because of the employee's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). A provi-
sion in ENDA preventing the classification or segregation of employees so as to deprive 
them of equal employment opportunities also closely tracks its counterpart provision in 
Title VII. Compare S. 1284, § 4(a)(2), and H.R. 2692, § 4(a)(2), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a) (2). 
142 Compare S. 1284, § 4(£), and H.R. 2692, § 4(£) (both disallowing disparate impact 
claims), with Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432-33 (1971) (reading Title VII as 
authorizing disparate impact claims) . 
143 SeeS. 1284, § 13(a); H.R. 2692, § 13(a). ENDA also includes a provision deeming "a 
State's receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program" to constitute a waiver 
of the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from lawsuit for the type of relief provided 
in the statute. S. 1284, § 13(b) (1) (A); H.R. 2692, § 13(b) (l)(A); see also sources cited infra 
note 144. This provision, presumably designed as an insurance policy against the Supreme 
Court holding ENDA to have exceeded Congress' Section 5 power, raises the question of 
whether ENDA would be an appropriate expression of Congress' power to place condi-
tions on its grants of financial assistance to the states. That question is beyond the scope of 
this Article, which focuses instead on the bill's grounding in Section 5. The framework for 
this analysis is provided by South Dakota v. Dow, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). While South Dakota's 
exceedingly lenient Spending Clause analysis was joined by seven Justices (Justice 
O'Connor dissented, see id. at 212, and Justice Brennan did not reach the issue, see id. 
(Brennan,]., dissenting», it is at least possible that the Court's recent enthusiasm for judi-
cially crafted federalism rules could prompt the Court to re-examine that issue. Indeed, a 
careful reading of South Dakota also suggests that the Court in that case did not definitively 
decide the contours of the most important factor: the relatedness between the spending 
condition and the federal interest in tlle program funded. See id. at 207-08 (stating this 
factor); id. at 209 & n.3 (refraining from conclusively establishing the degree of related-
ness required); see also ColI. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 
527 U.S. 666, 686 (1999) (acknowledging that South Dakota also indicated that a federal 
financial inducement to the states could be so coercive as to constitute unconstitutional 
compulsion). If the Court does re-examine the scope of the Spending Clause, then 
ENDA's Section 5 support would become dispositive. At any rate, there may well be par-
ticular state programs mat in fact do not receive federal financial assistance, and for which 
ENDA's Section 5 authorization would constitute the only support for abrogating state 
sovereign immunity from claims for retrospective relief. 
144 SeeS. 1284, 13(c)(2); H.R. 2692, § 13(c)(2). 
145 SeeS. 1284, § 8(c); H.R. 2692, § 8(c). ENDA also prohibits employers from adopting 
or instituting quotas based on sexual orientation. SeeS. 1284, § 8(a); H.R. 2692, § 8(a). 
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It "does not apply to the provision of employee benefits to an individ-
ual for the benefit of the domestic partner of such individual. "146 
ENDA does not apply to religious organizations,147 the military,l48 or 
employers employing fewer than fifteen persons.149 It also allows em-
ployers to enforce rules regarding "nonprivate sexual conduct" if such 
rules apply equally regardless of sexual orientation.150 Enforcement is 
analogous to enforcement under Title VIP 51 
B. Determining the Fourteenth Amendment Violation 
In order to determine whether ENDA is "appropriate" Section 5 
legislation, the first step is to determine the scope of the constitu-
tional violation inhering in state government employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of sexual orientation. As the Court in Garrett noted, 
under Section 5 "Congress is not limited to mere legislative repetition 
of [the Supreme] Court's constitutional jurisprudence, "152 but instead 
has the power "both to remedy and to deter violation of rights guar-
anteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by prohibiting a somewhat 
broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself forbidden 
by the Amendment's text. "153 The Garrett Court continued by noting 
that "legislation reaching beyond the scope of Section l's actual guar-
antees must exhibit 'congruence and proportionality between the in-
jury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that 
end.'''154 
This statement of the law suggests that different inquiries may be 
appropriate for legislation that simply repeats the constitutional limits 
on state action the Court has found inhere in the Fourteenth 
Amendment and for legislation that prohibits conduct beyond those 
limits in order to remedy or deter unconstitutional conduct. The first 
146 s. 1284, § 6; H.R. 2692, § 6. 
147 See S. 1284, § 9; H.R. 2692, § 9 ("This Act shall not apply to a religious organiza-
tion."). Religious organizations are defined to include educational institutions either 
owned or controlled by religious associations or societies or whose curriculum is directed 
toward religious propagation. See S. 1284, § 3(8); H.R. 2692, § 3(8). By contrast, Title VII 
exempts religious organizations (defined similarly as in ENDA) only from its prohibition 
on religious discrimination. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1994). 
148 SeeS. 1284, § 10; H.R. 2692, § 10. 
149 SeeS. 1284, § 3(4) (A); H.R. 2692, § 3(4) (A). 
150 SeeS. 1284, § 11 (a); H.R. 2692, § II (a). 
151 SeeS. 1284, § 12(a) (1) (A); H.R. 2692, § 12(a) (1) (A). 
152 121 S. Ct. at 963. 
153Id. (citing Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 u.S. 62, 81 (2000); City of Boerne v. flo-
res, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997». 
154 121 S. Ct. at 963 (quoting City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536). 
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of these conceptions of the Section 5 power is hardly exceptional. If 
the Section 5 power means anything, it must mean that Congress has 
the power to prohibit conduct in general that the Court has found, in 
a particular case, to violate the Constitution, as well as the power to 
create remedies for such unconstitutional conduct. The narrowest 
conception of the Section 5 power must include the power to prohibit 
as a general rule what the Supreme Court has declared to be uncon-
stitutional in the context of a particular case. Indeed, given the 
Court's statement in Cooper v. Aaron that a principle of constitutional 
law enunciated by the Supreme Court is itself the "supreme Law of 
the Land," such a power is close to superfluous,155 The congressional 
power to create remedies for such unconstitutional conduct is only 
slightly broader. This power too must be uncontroversial, as a matter 
of textual interpretation, if Section 5's explicit grant of power to "en-
force" the Fourteenth Amendment is to have any meaning. 
Thus, logically the task is simply to determine what sorts of sexual 
orientation discrimination the Court has already found to violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment and compare that invidious discrimination 
to the conduct outlawed in ENDA. Because disability discrimination 
has a constitutional status quite analogous to discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation, Garrett provides a useful guide for how the 
Court may approach that inquiry. 
As with sexual orientation discrimination, the Court has on one 
occasion, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, struck down a gov-
ernment action discriminating against the disabled on the ground 
that it failed the rational basis test.156 The Garrett Court characterized 
Cleburne as a case where the Court simply applied standard rational 
basis review and struck the action down as reflecting "mere negative 
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in 
a zoning proceeding. "157 The Court then noted that in the ADA Con-
155 358 u.s. 1, 18 (1958). Compare, e.g., id., with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 
648-49 (1966) ("A construction of § 5 that would require ajudicial determination that the 
enforcement of the state law precluded by Congress violated the Amendment, as a condi-
tion of sustaining the congressional enactment, would depreciate both congressional re-
sourcefulness and congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment. It would 
confine the legislative power in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only 
those state laws that the judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of 
merely informing the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the majestic generalities 
of§ 1 of the Amendment.") (citation omitted). 
156 See gmuraUy City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
157 121 S. Ct. at 964 (quoting Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 448). The action challenged in 
Cleburne was a city ordinance requiring a special permit for a group home for the mentally 
disabled but which did not require such a permit for other types of group homes. 
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gress had failed to provide sufficient evidence that states were engag-
ing in a pattern of discrimination motivated by such negative atti-
tudes, divorced from proper government ends. I5S 
Applying this first step of the analysis to the situation posed by 
sexual orientation discrimination, the challenge will be to character-
ize the constitutional violation in Rnmer, the one case in which the 
Court has found anti-gay discrimination to be unconstitutional. I59 
C. What is the Equal Protection Violation in Romer? 
Commentators have described Justice Kennedy's opinion in R0-
mer in a variety of ways: a reflection of an "anti-caste" principle inher-
ent in the Equal Protection Clause,I6o a gloss on the Bill of Attainder 
Clause,I61 an example of heightened scrutiny under the more strin-
gent version of the rational basis test,I62 and the first step toward 
granting homosexuality suspect class status. I63 Assuming that a future 
Court dealing with a challenge to ENDA would not read into Rnmer 
the broader, more speculative content suggested by the "anti-caste" 
theory or the quasi-Bill of Attainder analysis,I64 and assuming further 
158 Id. at 964-66. 
159 See generally 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
160 See generally Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 CONST. COM-
MENT. 257 (1996). 
161 See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 
MICH. L. REv. 203 (1996). 
162 See generally, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Is Amendment 2 Really a Bill of Attainder? Some 
Questions Abvut Professor A mar's Analysis of Romer, 95 MICH. L. REv. 236 (1996). 
163 See generally, e.g., Jerald W. Rogers, Note, Romer v. Evans: Heightened Scrutiny Has 
Found a Rational Basis-Is The Court Tacitly Recognizing Quasi-Suspect Status for Gays, Lesbians, 
and Bisexuals?, 45 V. KAN. L. REv. 953 (1997). 
164 This is not to suggest that such readings are "incorrect," in the sense that they are 
logically unsupportable, historically inaccurate, or fail to lead to a coherent understanding 
of the Constitution. It is to suggest, however, that such readings are not the ones most 
likely to be adopted by the Court if and when it needs to characterize Romerwhen dealing 
with a future challenge to ENDA. If Garrett is any indication, the Court will simply read 
Romer very narrowly (as Garrett Court read Cleburne). On the other hand, it should be 
noted that there is at least some difference in the tones of Cleburne and Romer. While 
Cleburne purported to be a simple application of the rational basis test (though with the 
unusual result that the statute failed the test), the Romer opinion continually notes the 
uniqueness of Amendment 2 and the harm it does to the equal protection principle. See 
Romer, 517 V.S. 620, 627 (1996) ("Sweeping and comprehensive is the change in legal 
status effected by [Amendment 2]."); id. ("The change that Amendment 2 works in the 
legal status of gays and lesbians in the private sphere is far reaching."); id. at 629 ("Not 
confined to the private sphere, Amendment 2 also operates to repeal and forbid all laws or 
policies providing specific protection for gays or lesbians from discrimination by every 
level of Colorado government."); id. at 632 ("Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even th[e] 
conventional inquiry [required by equal protection, into the relationship between statu-
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that it would not use Romer as the jumping off point for declaring sex-
ual orientation a suspect classification,165 the Court would be left with 
the need simply to take Romer at its word, for what it actually said, 
rather than for what it implied or for what it should logically lead 
to.166 Thus, a close reading of Romer seems appropriate. 
Romer considered a challenge to Amendment 2, an amendment 
to the Colorado Constitution enacted by the people of Colorado in a 
referendum election in 1992.167 Amendment 2 stated, in relevant part: 
[N]either the State ... nor any of its ... subdivisions ... 
shall enact ... or enforce any statute ... or policy whereby 
homosexual ... orientation [or] conduct ... shall constitute 
or otherwise be the basis of . . . any protected . . . status or 
claim of discrimination .... "168 
The majority's analysis of this provision was surprisingly terse, taking 
up little over four pages in the U.S. Reports.169 The Court cited two 
tory ends and means]. First, the amendment has the peculiar property of imposing a 
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group, an exceptional and ... 
invalid form of legislation."); id. at 633 ("Amendment 2 confounds th [e] normal process 
of judicial review [under the Equal Protection Clause).") ; id. ('The resulting dis-
qualification of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from the law is 
unprecedented in our jurisprudence."); id. ("It is not within our constitutional tradition to 
enact laws of this sort."). The point, then, is that it is always possible that the Court, in 
construing Romer in the future, may well point to the uniqueness of Amendment 2 as re-
quiring a unique response, for example, the enunciation of an "anti-caste" principle. See id. 
at 635 ("We must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to further a 
proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone else .... A State cannot so 
deem a class of persons a stranger to its laws. ") . 
165 The classic example of such a progression is in gender, where the Court's first deci-
sion striking down a gender classification, Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76, 77 (1971), was 
based on the rational basis standard. Within two years, four members of the Court had 
argued that gender should be a suspect classification, see Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677, 688 (1973), and within five years a m,yority had accepted intermediate or quasi-
suspect status for gender, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976). The Court, how-
ever, has not recognized a new suspect or quasi-suspect class since the 1970s, preferring 
instead to strike laws down under the rational basis test. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442-47 (1985) (refusing to accord suspect class status 
to the mentally retarded, but striking down a law that burdened that group on the ground 
that it failed the rational basis test). But see United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 553 
(1996) (using the intermediate scrutiny test to strike down a gender classification, but 
arguably redefining that test to require more stringent scrutiny). 
166 Compare cases cited supra at note 165 and accompanying text (tracing the progres-
sion of the Court's treatment of gender classifications). 
167 Details about the referendum, and the course of the Romer litigation, can be found 
in Rogers, supra note 163, at 954-56. 
168 COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b, repealed by Romer, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
169 See Romer; 517 U.S. at 631-35. 
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reasons for striking down Amendment 2. First, it concluded that 
Amendment 2 "confounds" normal rational basis review.170 According 
to the Court, Amendment 2 was different from laws upheld under the 
rational basis standard because those laws were "narrow enough in 
scope and grounded in a sufficient factual context for us to ascertain 
[that there existed] some relation between the classification and the 
purpose it served," thus ensuring "that classifications are not drawn 
for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law."171 
By contrast, Amendment 2's extreme combination of a group, 
identified by a single trait, which is then denied protection across the 
board via a broad-ranging disability,172 results in the "disqualification 
of a class of persons from the right to seek specific protection from 
the law,"173 making it "in general more difficult for one group of citi-
zens than for all others to seek aid from the government."174 Accord-
ing to the Court, this sort of broad-based denial of government assis-
tance, based on a single trait, constituted a violation of equal 
protection in its most literal sense.175 
The Court's second reason for striking down Amendment 2 was 
much more prosaic and, perhaps for that reason, easier to express. 
The Court concluded that the broad-based nature of the disabilities 
Amendment 2 imposed on gays and lesbians exceeded any legitimate 
purpose the government might have had, thus leaving animus as the 
only explanation for its enactment.176 The Court noted that Colorado 
defended Amendment 2 as a means of respecting the associational 
rights of landlords and employers that might object to homosexuality 
and as a way the state could conserve its resources to fight discrimina-
tion against other groups)77 The Court found these justifications 
"impossible to credit" given how much further Amendment 2's bur-
dens ran.178 The Court concluded that Amendment 2 violated a "con-
ventional and venerable" principle of equal protection: Namely, that a 
170 See id. at 633. 
171 [d. at 632-33. 
172 See id. at 632. 
173 [d. at 633; see also id. at 626--31 (characterizing the effect of Amendment 2 as an ex-
clusion of homosexuals from the right to equal treatment by the government in a broad 
variety of contexts). 
174 Romer, 517 U.S. at 633. 
175 [d. ("A law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult for one group of citi-
zens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws in the most literal sense."). 
176 See id. at 632. 
177 See id. 
178 See id. 
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law must bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government in-
terest.179 
Leaving aside the more speculative theories about Romcr,l80 for 
our purposes the unifying theme in the Court's rationale is the lack of 
legitimate justification-and thus the irrationality-of the 
classification given the scope of the burdens Amendment 2 placed on 
gays and lesbians.18l The Court's second justification, that Amend-
ment 2 simply failed standard rational basis review, clearly reflects this 
concern, as the imbalance between Amendment 2's ends and means 
raised the suspicion that the provision was motivated by another, ille-
gitimate, motivation. The Court's first justification also reflects the 
concern about legitimate justification, as the Court was simply suspi-
cious that any enactment so broad could serve a legitimate govern-
ment interest. 
Thus, in determining whether ENDA simply targets or provides a 
remedy for discrimination of the sort condemned in Romer, it might 
be helpful to begin by considering the rationality (in the constitu-
tional sense) of sexual orientation discrimination in state government 
employment. 
D. Is ENDA Targeted at Unconstitutionally Irrational Sexual 
Orientation Discrimination? 
The strongest argument distinguishing the ADA from ENDA may 
be that employment discrimination against gays and lesbians is simply 
irrational in a way that various types of discrimination against the dis-
abled are not. In both Cleburne and Romer, the Court struck down state 
action as violating the Equal Protection Clause, even though dis-
crimination against the burdened group-respectively, the mentally 
disabled and homosexuals-ostensibly received only rational basis 
scrutiny.182 In both cases, the Court concluded that the government 
action was motivated by animus or fear-that is, by reasons that are 
illegitimate for purposes of the rational basis test, which requires a 
179 See Romer, 517 V.S. at 632. 
180 See supra notes 160-165 and accompanying text. 
181 Obviously, this is an extreme over simplification. As will be clear shortly, a major 
difference between the violation reflected in Amendment 2 and the discrimination out-
lawed by ENDA is that the former is much broader, stretching across, as the Court de-
scribed, "an almost limitless number of transaction and endeavors that constitute ordinary 
civic life in a free society." Romer, 517 V.S. at 631. 
182 See id. at 632; City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 V.S. 432, 443, 444 
(1985). 
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rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose.183 In Garrett, 
the Court concluded that a state's refusal to provide the accommoda-
tions required by the ADA might not be motivated by such an ille-
gitimate purpose, but instead by a rational (in the Court's words, 
"hardheaded") 184 desire to save money, as cruel ("hardhearted") 185 as 
that decision may be. Although left unsaid, the Court's analysis clearly 
implies that such a refusal to take the steps required by the ADA 
might be irrational in a broader sense-given either the value dis-
abled workers could produce if provided an accommodation or, even 
more generally, the net social benefit of making it possible for dis-
abled individuals to work and participate in society.186 However, the 
standard rational basis test leaves to the state the balancing of these 
costs and benefits. 
Would the same analysis apply to employment discrimination 
against gays? In other words, is there a "hardheaded" cost-benefit bal-
ancing that would go into a state decision to engage in employment 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation? There does not 
seem to be, for the obvious reason that a rule of non-discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation would not necessarily require states 
to spend funds to modifY most workplaces to take account of or ac-
commodate differing sexual orientations.187 The one possible way in 
which employing gays and lesbians may in fact require extra costs 
among states would be if other workers' resistance or hostility to the 
presence of a gay co-worker required the state to shift personnel or 
otherwise alter the workplace, thereby increasing the state's costs.188 
Is it otherwise rational to engage in workplace discrimination on 
the basis of sexual orientation? This is, of course, an important ques-
tion to ask for the Section 5 analysis. Indeed, it would be dispositive if 
the answer is "no." The Court in Garrett stated that "Section 5 legisla-
tion reaching beyond the scope of Section l's actual guarantees must 
exhibit 'congruence and proportionality between the injury to be 
183 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632; Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 443-47. 
184 121 S. Ct. at 964. 
185 Id. 
186 Indeed, Congress made a finding to this effect. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (9) (1994) 
("[T]he continuing existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination [against people 
with disabilities] ... costs the United States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses 
resulting from dependency and non productivity. "). 
187 Although the military is a possible exception, ENDA is inapplicable to the military. 
See infra note 229 and accompanying text. 
188 See infra notes 206-211 and accompanying text. 
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prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. "'189 Thus, 
congruence and proportionality seem to be unnecessary if the legisla-
tion directly aims at actual Fourteenth Amendment violations.1oo This 
Article now considers whether sexual orientation discrimination of 
the type prohibited in ENDA can ever be rational. 
1. Status and Conduct, "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" and Bowers v. Hardwick 
Perhaps surprisingly, relatively few courts have considered the 
constitutionality of government employment discrimination against 
gays and lesbians, at least outside of the realm of discharges from mili-
tary service. Some employment dismissals are defended on the theory 
that the plaintiff's expression of her sexual orientation, or her acting 
in a way consistent with it (say, by participating in a same-sex marriage 
ceremony), constituted disruptive conduct that justified the dismissal 
completely apart from the plaintiffs sexual orientation.191 Relatedly, 
in cases dealing with law enforcement jobs or those involving security 
clearances, courts have held that government has the power to ex-
clude on the basis of whether the individual has violated the law or 
lied when asked about his sexual orientation.192 Strictly speaking, 
these cases are not relevant to the question of whether sexual orienta-
tion itself-as a status, divorced from conduct-is a constitutionally 
permissible ground for firing or not hiring someone. They do, how-
ever, thereby raise a subsidiary question: To what extent is sexual ori-
entation relevant in that homosexual or bisexual orientation allows 
the government rationally to presume homosexual conduct?193 A state 
189 121 S. Ct. at 963 (citing City ofBoernev. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997». 
190 This, of course, is not surprising; such legislation would be doing nothing more 
than prohibiting legislatively the sort of conduct that the Court has already held to be a 
violation of the Constitution. &e supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
191 &e generalJy, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1997) (en bane) (up-
holding dismissal of lesbian from attorney general's office because of certain conduct, 
including her participation in a same-sex marriage ceremony, which the Attorney General 
thought might affect the efficiency of the office's performance). These cases raise compli-
cated issues of free speech and association law. For an examination of these issues in the 
employment context, see generally Marvin Hill & Emily Delacenseri, Procrustean Beds and 
Draconian Clwices: Lifestyli! Regulations, and Officious Intermedd1£rs - Bosses, Workers, Courts and 
Labor Arbitrators, 57 Mo. L. REv. 51 (1992); see also id. at 140, 141 (summarizing caselaw and 
suggesting appropriate rules). 
192 &e generally, e.g., Doe v. Gates, 981 F.2d 1316 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (involving an em-
ployee who lied to the CIA about his sexual orientation); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (citing problem that would arise with a law enforcement officer poten-
tially engaging in illegal conduct). 
19! Very often courts have simply presumed that a person's homosexual orientation in-
dicates a likelihood that she will engage in homosexual sex. &e, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 
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whose law criminalizes sodomy might well argue that it is rational for 
it to engage in employment discrimination against homosexuals be-
cause they have a propensity for violating the law, even though such a 
classification might be seriously under or over inclusive.194 
The main battleground on which this status versus conduct ar-
gument has been played out has been the military under the "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell" policy.195 Under that policy, the military can dis-
charge anyone who engages in homosexual acts or who states that 
they are gay or lesbian unless they can prove that they do not have a 
propensity to engage in homosexual acts.196 Thus, while seemingly 
only proscribing conduct (engaging in homosexual acts or having a 
propensity to do so), the policy, according to some commentators, 
effectively proscribes status since it is relatively easy for the military to 
argue that the status of being homosexual indicates a propensity to 
engage in homosexual acts.197 This logic has led courts to uphold the 
policy. 198 
If the Court were to follow such a path with regard to ENDA, it 
might well strike the statute down as going beyond unconstitutional 
sexual orientation discrimination on the ground that a state would 
have a rational reason to discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion to the extent that sexual orientation indicated a propensity to 
violate the law, that is, to commit a sex crime.l99 While a propensity to 
881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989). The presumption that homosexual orientation infers 
homosexual conduct is, of course, the underlying principle of the military'S current "Don't 
Ask, Don't Tell" policy. See Diane H. Mazur, Word Games, War Games, 98 MICH. L. REv. 1590, 
1598-1600 (2000) (reviewing JANET E. HALLEY, DON'T: A READER'S GUIDE TO THE MILI-
TARY'S ANTI-GAY POLICY (1999». 
194 See, e.g., Michele L. Booth, Shahar v. Bowers: Is Public opinion Transformed into a Ik 
gitimate Government Interest lWzen Government Acts as Empluyer?, 78 B.U. L. REv. 1235, 1260 
(1998) (citing evidence that common sexual activities between lesbians are often not pro-
hibited by sodomy laws); id. at 1262 (citing evidence that most heterosexuals have engaged 
in illegal sexual activities). 
195 10 U.S.C. § 654 (1994). 
196 See Mazur, supra note 193, at 1595 . 
. 197 See, e.g., id. at 1598-1600. 
198 See, e.g., Able v. United States, 88 F.3d 1280, 1298 (2d Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. 
Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 929 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc); Hoffman v. United States, 1997 WL 
136418, *3 (E.D. Pa. 1997); see also, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677, 688-93 (D.C. Cir. 
1994) (upholding, under pre-"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, a dismissal of a midshipman at 
the Naval Academy because of his statement that he was a homosexual on the ground that 
his statement of homosexual orientation provided a rational basis for the military to pre-
sume that he was likely to engage in homosexual conduct). See generally, e.g., Thorne v. 
Dep't. of De f., 945 F. Supp. 924 (E.D. Va. 1996). 
199 See generally Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding a state law crimi-
nalizing sodomy). However, in that case the Supreme Court dealt only with the argument 
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violate the law might be more relevant to some state jobs than oth-
ers--for example, more relevant to a state trooper position than to a 
clerical one-a state's desire to have law-abiding employees presuma-
bly would be considered legitimate. Nevertheless, it should not be 
taken for granted that a sexual orientation job criterion would be 
sufficiently linked to that goal as to survive rational basis scrutiny.200 
To the extent that state sex crime laws simply prohibit certain types of 
sex, regardless of the gender of those engaged in it, there is evidence 
that heterosexuals engage in such illegal sexual conduct at least as 
frequently as homosexuals.201 
Given cases upholding classifications with only the most tenuous 
relation to legitimate interests,202 the Court would have to apply a 
more stringent type of rational basis review in order to strike down 
such a statute on this theory. On the other hand, to the extent that a 
state's sex crimes law prohibits such conduct only when engaged in 
between two persons of the same sex, such a prohibition may itself be 
constitutionally problematic as a matter of equal protection.203 With-
out a rational reason for singling out gays and lesbians, Romer provides 
at least some hope that the current Court would strike such legisla-
tion down, or at least not credit it as providing a state with a legitimate 
justification for discriminating against gays and lesbians in employ-
ment. 
Thus, a state may not have a good argument that it should be 
able to engage in sexual orientation-based employment discrimina-
tion because sexual orientation is a marker for a propensity to engage 
in illegal conduct that the state can constitutionally seek to prevent in 
its workforce. Nevertheless, Hardwick remains a hurdle, requiring the 
Court not only to disentangle the concepts of status and conduct, but 
to decouple the two by refusing to credit the argument that sexual 
based in substantive due process, namely, as framed by the majority, the argument that the 
right to privacy found in the due process clause included the right to engage in homosex-
ual sodomy. See id. at 190, 191. It explicitly refrained from considering the equal protection 
issue. See id. at 196 n.8. 
200 This issue would not arise at all in a state that did not have a sodomy law. 
201 See sources cited infra note 287. 
202 See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (upholding California's Proposi-
tion 13 property tax statute based, in part, on the relationship between differential tax 
treatment of newly acquired and long-held property on a possible state interest in neigh-
borhood stability); Ry. Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 109-10 (1949) (uphold-
ing differential treatment of truck signage advertising the truck owner's own products and 
signage rented out to third parties based on the possible safety differences traffic experts 
may have discerned between them). 
203 See supra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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orientation is a legally sufficient marker for same-sex conduct.204 It is, 
however, exactly that sort of careful analysis that would require the 
Court to engage in a more searching review than suggested by the 
standard rational basis test.205 To the extent that such unusually 
searching "rational basis" review is necessary, it might militate against 
the Court's willingness to hold that sexual orientation employment 
discrimination is irrational. 
2. Pure Status Arguments 
On the other hand, some courts have focused their analysis 
squarely on the question whether sexual orientation discrimination in 
employment is constitutional. For example, in Weaver v. Nebo School 
District,206 a federal district court granted summary judgment to a les-
bian high school teacher/athletic coach who was removed as a coach 
after she disclosed her orientation in response to a student's question 
and thus according to school officials, caused controversy. The court 
explicitly rejected as insufficient grounds for the school's action the 
community's supposed negative response to her disclosure, "[iJf the 
community's perception is based on nothing more than unsupported 
assumptions, outdated stereotypes, and animosity."207 According to 
the court, the only appropriate justification for removing the plaintiff 
would have been one related to her job performance.208 
If community dislike is an inappropriate ground for employment 
discrimination, presumably it would be insufficient for a state to jus-
tifY employment discrimination on the ground that co-workers would 
resist or be hostile to a gay or lesbian colleague. In both situations, the 
employer would have to incur costs in order to ensure a smoothly 
204 For a discussion of the relationship between status and conduct in the context of 
sexual orientation, see, for example, Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kulturkampj, or How 
America Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick Even Though Romer v. Evans Didn't, 49 DUIrn LJ. 
1559, 157&-80 (2000); Anne B. Goldstein, Reasoning About Homosexuality: A Commentary on 
janet Halley:S Reasoning about Sodomy: Act and Identity in and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. 
L. REv. 1781, 1790-94 (1993). 
205 Other commentators have noted the difficulty Hardwick presents for gay rights ad-
vocates, even when they litigate issues unrelated to due process. See, e.g., Mary C. Dunlap, 
Gay Men and Lesbians Down By Law in the 1990's USA: The Continuing Toll of Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 24 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 1, 17-24 (1994); see also Patricia A. Cain, Litigating for 
Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History, 79 VA. L. REv. 1551, 1587 (1993) (noting that his-
torically, sodomy's criminalization assisted in the oppression of gays and lesbians in areas 
such as government employment). 
206 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (D. Utah 1998). 
207Id. at 1289. 
208Id. 
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functioning workplace: In Weaver, the school would have to spend 
time, and perhaps money, in responding to parental complaints, edu-
cating both parents and students, and generally calming the situation 
and ensuring physical safety. This is exactly what the state as employer 
would have to do if the complaining or resisting parties were co-
workers.209 If such costs, or the general tension caused by the mixture 
of gay and homophobic individuals, are not considered rational rea-
sons to allow the state to discriminate in Weaver, they should not be 
considered any different when the complaining or resisting parties 
are co-workers. Thus, assuming that there is no other "hardheaded" 
reason for discriminating against a lesbian or gay person, and further 
assuming that the removal was not for reasons of conduct as opposed 
to mere orientation,210 there would appear to be no room for moral-
ity-based community disapproval to justify discrimination.21l 
It should be noted that this argument does not deny the more 
general role of morality in law. Indeed, as a doctrinal matter, the Su-
preme Court in Hardwick made it clear that morality is a constitution-
ally appropriate justification for prohibitions on at least some con-
duct. 212 But, decisions such as Weaver suggest that morality cannot 
209 See grnerally id. at 1279. 
210 Compare, e.g., Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1106-08 (11th Cir. 1997) (upholding 
dismissal of lesbian from attorney general's office because of certain conduct, including 
her participation in a same-sex marriage ceremony, that the Attorney General thought 
might affect the office's performance), with Padula v. Webster, 822 F. 2d 97, 102, 104 (D.C. 
Cir. 1987) (concluding that the FBI could rationally refuse to hire a lesbian candidate be-
cause her sexual orientation suggested a propensity to engage in conduct that might be 
illegal in areas in which she would be operating as a law enforcement officer). But see 
sources cited infra note 287 (citing studies suggesting the under- and over-inclusiveness of 
Padula's rationale). 
211 See Weaver, 29 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. For other examples of similar reasoning outside 
the potentially special context of the military, see Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 458 
(7th Cir. 1996) (holding that school officials had no rational basis for failing to protect a 
high school student from harassment based on his sexual orientation);Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. 
Supp. 1543,1548-52 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding both that sexual orientation is an inherently 
suspect classification and that employment discrimination against homosexuals is irra-
tional in contexts where there is no issue of security clearances or special risk if the em-
ployee engages in illegal action), rev'd on other grounds, 976 F.2d 623, 627-30 (10th Cir. 
1992) (holding that rule against sexual orientation discrimination in government em-
ployment was not well settled when the offending conduct occurred and that defendants 
were entitled to qualified immunity); see a~o Woodard v. Gallagher, 1992 WI.. 252279, *3 
(Fla. Cir. Ct. 1992) (concluding that sexual orientation should receive heightened rational 
basis scrutiny but deciding case on other grounds) . 
212 See 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986); see a~o Barnes v. Glen Theater, 501 U.S. 560,572,575 
(1991) (Scalia,J., concurring in the judgment) (concluding that a ban on public nudity 
was constitutionally valid because of government's power to enforce good morals). But see 
id. at 570 (plurality opinion); id. at 582 (Souter,]., concurring); id. at 590, 591 (White,J., 
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serve as a rational basis justifying different treatment of groups based 
on status such as sexual orientation. Indeed, combining Hardwick and 
Romer seems to require that conclusion. In Hardwick the Court explic-
itly stated that morality may be a valid government interest for ban-
ning certain conduct,213 while Romer held Amendment 2 unconstitu-
tional in part because it concluded that it was based on animus toward 
homosexuals.214 But even if harmonizing Hardwick and Romer does not 
require this conclusion, it nevertheless surely seems a reasonable 
reading of the Equal Protection Clause, especially in light of other 
cases prohibiting the criminalization of statuses some of whose char-
acteristic conduct can be proscribed.215 And if such a conclusion 
seems reasonable, then there is all the more reason to view ENDA as a 
confirmation of the equal protection guarantee, rather than a rewrit-
ing of it. 216 
3. The Significance of END A's Limits 
a. Reading Romer as Unique 
The problem with the foregoing analysis is that the Court may 
simply cut it off by pointing to the uniqueness of the burdens 
Amendment 2 placed on gays and lesbians. Certainly there are 
sufficient references in Romer to Amendment 2's novelty to allow the 
Court to distinguish it from more targeted discrimination prohibited 
in ENDA.217 Amendment 2's uniqueness affected the Romer Court's 
analysis in two very different ways. The Court's first rationale for strik-
ing down Amendment 2 did in fact focus on the law's uniqueness, as 
dissenting) (resting their analyses on the degree to which nude dancing enjoyed First 
Amendment protection and on the weight of the non-morality based justifications offered 
for the statute). 
2U See 478 U.S. at 196. 
214 See 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996); seeal50Bd. ofTr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. 
Ct. 955, 964 (2001) (reading Cleburne as concluding that the government action was based 
on prejudice and thus was unconstitutional); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 
U.S. 432, 448-50 (1985) (concluding that the government action was based on prejudice 
and thus was unconstitutional). 
215 Compare, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667, 668 (1962) (striking down a 
law criminalizing the status of being a drug addict). 
216 Compare generally City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (striking down RFRA 
on the grounds that it essentially overturned the Court's decision in Smith); see also infra 
notes 327-340 and accompanying text (suggesting a broader scope for congressional en-
forcement of the Equal Protection Clause, as compared with the other provisions of the 
Fourteenth Amendment). 
217 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
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the Court held that Amendment 2's very breadth constituted a literal 
violation of the equal protection guarantee.218 However, Romers sec-
ond rationale was much more prosaic: The Court held that the law 
simply lacked a rational link to any legitimate justification.219 Of 
course that lack of linkage was suggested by Amendment 2's unique 
breadth; nevertheless, the principle underlying the Court's second 
rationale was, as the Court noted, "conventional and venerable. "220 
It cannot seriously be argued that employment discrimination is a 
burden so broad as to constitute a literal violation of equal protection 
as was Amendment 2. Thus, in order for Romer to support the proposi-
tion that sexual orientation-based employment discrimination is con-
stitutionally irrational, it may be necessary to make the more conven-
tional argument that the sexual orientation-based employment 
discrimination prohibited in ENDA simply fails the standard rational 
basis test. Much of this argument has been made above;221 however, 
one piece remains. This sub-part of the argument considers the limits 
on ENDA's anti-discrimination rule and examines whether those lim-
its succeed in narrowing its scope to government conduct that is most 
arguably unconstitutional. 
b. ENDA's Limitations 
Several provisions of ENDA limit the scope of its prohibition on 
sexual orientation-based employment discrimination. First, ENDA 
makes proving sexual orientation discrimination harder than proving 
discrimination based on other criteria by providing that disparate im-
pact is insufficient to make out a claim of discrimination.222 Not only 
does this limitation make it harder to prove an ENDA claim than, say, 
a Title VII-based claim,223 but, more importantly, it links ENDA to the 
intent requirement of the Equal Protection Clause.224 Even more, 
making mere disparate impact insufficient makes successful ENDA 
claims more reflective of the Court's concern in Romer-namely, that 
218 See Romer, 517 U.S. at 626,627. 
219 See id. at 631,635. 
220 Id. at 635. 
221 See supra notes 182-216 and accompanying text. 
222 Compare S. 1284, 107th Cong. §4(f) (2001), and H.R. 2692, 107th Cong. §4(f) 
(2001), with BARBARA L. SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAw 
81-114 (1996) (describing adverse impact claims under Title VII). 
225 See id. 
224 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 243 (1976) (requiring discriminatory intent 
before an equal protection violation can be made out). 
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Amendment 2 was motivated by animus, a conscious desire to burden 
a person based on a particular trait. Thus, while tying the ENDA stan-
dard to the violation in Romer makes an ENDA claim harder to prove, 
the claims that do survive are more likely to reflect the unconstitu-
tional animus that underlay the constitutional problem in Romer.225 
Second, ENDA excludes from its purview any claim relating to 
provision of benefits for spouses or unmarried partners.226 Without 
this provision, such a claim (whether ultimately successful or not) 
would flow naturally from a general prohibition against sexual orien-
tation discrimination, since states generally provide benefits only for 
spouses and children, and since no state recognizes same-sex mar-
riages. By excluding such claims, ENDA focuses more narrowly on 
employment discrimination concerns completely divorced from any 
state interest in limiting marriage (or the benefits thereof) to hetero-
sexual couples. The point here is that, unless courts are willing to in-
terpret federal equal protection guarantees as requiring states to 
make marriage available to same-sex couples, the limiting of marriage 
to opposite-sex couples will be held, by hypothesis, constitutionally 
rationa1.227 If so, then job-related sexual orientation discrimination 
could also be considered rational if it is justified as a way of prevent-
ing gay employees from demanding, as a component of workplace 
equality, job-related benefits for their partners that "undermine" the 
special status states accord the marriage relationships the state has 
reserved for opposite-sex couples. By excluding that issue from its 
purview, ENDA focuses on the aspect of state conduct-discrimina-
tion in the simple act of employment, unrelated to spousal benefits-
that does not implicate the state's interests with regard to marriage.228 
225 If it is true that strict scrutiny is reserved for classifications that the Court believes 
are rarely relevant to legitimate government interests, it makes doctrinal sense to limit 
sexual orientation discrimination as a Section 5 matter to intentional discrimination. 
While disparate impact on the basis of a ground like race does not by itself call for strict 
scrutiny, see, e.g., id. at 242, the fact that race is so disfavored as a classification tool might 
make it justifiable to consider disparate impact stronger evidence of animus in that area, as 
opposed to sexual orientation. At least, this would be consistent with the relegation of 
sexual orientation to rational basis review. Compare, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62, 88 (2000) ("[D]ifficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies, 
and we have never held that Section 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably pro-
phylactic legislation."). 
226 See, e.g., S. 1284, § 6, 107th Congo (2001); S. 1276, § 6, 106th Congo (1999). 
227 This is not to comment on the correctness of such a holding. It is, instead, to view 
ENDA within the fabric of the law as it is likely to exist for at least the near future. 
228 The Vermont Supreme Court, of course, has ruled that the state constitution's 
"common benefits" clause requires that at least some version of marriage and its benefits 
be made available to same-sex couples. See generally Baker V. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 
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Third, other provisions of ENDA, while not directly applicable to 
states, underscore its overall limited nature. First, ENDA has no appli-
cation to the military, thus exempting the institution that, because of 
its uniqueness, presents a different argument for excluding gays and 
lesbians.229 Second, the statute exempts businesses with fewer than 
fifteen employees.23o Finally, the statute exempts religious organiza-
tions. These latter two limitations reflect a respect for free association 
and free exercise values embodied in the First Amendment when 
those values might be most threatened by a non-discrimination 
rule.231 While a state would not fall under the "small employer" excep-
tion and while Establishment Clause concerns presumably mean that 
a state would not be affected by the exemption for religious organiza-
tions,232 these exemptions reflect again the bill's concern for targeting 
1999). This has led to the now well-known Vermont institution of "civil union." VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 15, Ch. 1 §§ 4 & 8, h. 23, §§ 1201-1207 (Supp. 2000). Still, the fact remains that 
Vermont is alone in recognizing such a relationship; moreover, other states have taken 
affirmative steps to refuse to recognize same-sex relationships that other jurisdictions may 
have legally recognized. See Nancy j. Feather, Defense of Marriage Acts: An Analysis Under State 
Constitutional Law, 70 TEMP. L. REv. 1017, 1019-21, 1033 (1997). Regardless of the ultimate 
constitutional fate of such refusals, complete equality for same-sex relationships is unlikely 
in the near future. Thus, ENDA confronts a legal landscape that will continue to feature 
official privileging of opposite-sex relationships. In turn, this reality will require ENDA, as a 
measure to remedy and ensure constitutional rights as currently understood, to be consis-
tent with this privileging. 
229 This is not to suggest that the argument is sufficient; instead, it simply acknowl-
edges the reality that the military presents a different and more difficult case for sexual 
orientation discrimination when compared with other, more ordinary, workplaces. 
2:10 See, e.g., S. 869, 105th Congo § 3(3) (1997); H.R.1858, 105th Congo § 3(3) (1997). 
231 The importance of a Section 5 enactment not infringing on other constitutional 
rights derives, at least indirectly, from the Morgan Court's insistence, in response to Justice 
Harlan's dissent in that case, that its broad reading of Congress' Section 5 authority did 
not empower Congress to draft legislation limiting Fourteenth Amendment rights. Compare 
384 V.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966) (majority opinion), with id. at 668 (Harlan,j., dissenting). 
Specifically, the Morgan Court rejected the argument that the challenged statute itself vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause by invidiously discriminating among non-English in-
structed individuals, favorably treating those educated in Puerto Rican schools and disfa-
voring those educated in non-American flag schools. Id. at 657. The Court rejected this 
argument because it characterized the statute as a reform measure that sought to increase 
voting rights. Id. However, the Court left open the possibility that there might be an equal 
protection problem with a state literacy law that classified between graduates of American-
flag and foreign schools. See id.; see also Ruth Colker, The Section Five Quagmire, 47 V.C.L.A. 
L. REv. 653, 676-77 (2000) (discussing this aspect of Morgan). This is not to suggest that 
ENDA presents a serious risk of infringing anyone's rights. The point, instead, is simply to 
note that ENDA can be conceived of as a statute of limited scope (and thus "appropriate" 
Section 5 legislation), its limitations marked in part by the borders of other constitutional 
rights that it respects. 
232 Proposed increases in the scope of government assistance for faith-based organiza-
tions, to the extent they survive constitutional challenge and are implemented by the 
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only that conduct that society considers so worthless as to be irra-
tional. Indeed, these exceptions tie in closely to the justifications 
Colorado offered in defense of Amendment 2, justifications that, 
while the Court did not believe (because Amendment 2 went so much 
further), the Court never said were illegitimate.233 
Taken together, ENDA's limitations narrow the class of prohib-
ited conduct to that which is most arguably unconstitutional. The dis-
allowance of disparate impact claims focuses the statute on conduct 
that is purposely directed at gays and lesbians and thus most likely to 
be motivated by unconstitutional animus. The other limitations ex-
clude from ENDA's purview situations where such purposeful dis-
crimination might be constitutional, either because the state might be 
thought to have a legitimate interest (limiting its recognition of 
committed relationships to heterosexual marriages or, in the case of 
the federal government, recognizing the special needs of the mili-
tary234) or because a competing private interest has some constitu-
tional stature (such as free religious exercise or a right to associate). 
E. Going Beyond Actual Violations: ENDA as Remedial or 
Prophylactic Legislation 
Assuming, however, that ENDA does not prohibit only conduct 
that is unconstitutional-in other words, assuming that states some-
times constitutionally engage in the type of employment discrimina-
states, may nevertheless raise some issue here. The example would be a state that provides 
assistance to a faith-based organization, whose sexual orientation discrimination then 
somehow becomes state action (the "somehow" alluding to the difficulty that would inhere 
in conceiving of the state as the actor for this purpose, but not when the organization ac-
tually goes out and acts in a religious way). In such a convoluted and potentially internally 
contradictory situation, ENDA's religious exemption would inure to the benefit of states. 
For an example of a fact pattern that comes close (though not precisely on point), see 
Employment Discrimination Against Gays & Lesbians, http://www.religioustolerance.org/ 
hom_empl.htm (last modified May 12, 2000) (detailing case of state-funded faith-based 
charity allegedly discriminating on the basis of sexual orien tation) . 
233 See supra note 177 and accompanying text; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 
(1996). 
234 Again, the fact that the party's whose interests are being considered, here, the fed-
eral government, is not subject to the Fourteenth Amendment means that this argument 
provides only indirect support for the proposition that ENDA is targeted at conduct that 
violates that Amendment. That indirect support, though, is significant, as it reflects the 
bill's overall concern for not intruding on other valid interests. Compare City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (concluding that RFRA is not proportional to any Free 
Exercise Clause violations committed by the states, in part because the statute works a 
"considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general 
authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens") . 
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tion ENDA prohibits-the inquiry shifts to whether the statute is a 
congruent and proportional response to conduct that is in fact un-
constitutional. Even under the Court's newer, stricter test for Section 
5 legislation, the Court has continued to accept the appropriateness 
of legislation that bans a "broader swath" of conduct than that actually 
prohibited by the Constitution in order to deter violations of the con-
stitutional rule.235 To determine whether such broader legislation 
represents an appropriate remedy or deterrent, the Court examines 
whether, first, the legislation is a congruent and proportional re-
sponse to those violations and, second, whether there is a pattern and 
practice of such violations that may have evaded the Court's own 
eyes.236 
1. Is ENDA Congruent and Proportional? 
Under the Court's post-City of Boerne v. Flores jurisprudence, con-
gruence and proportionality require that there be some relationship 
between the statute justified under the Section 5 power and the un-
derlying constitutional violation. While this concept is not particularly 
novel,237 cases starting with City of Boerne have required a tighter fit 
between the statute and the violation.238 In Kimel, Florida Prepaid v. Col-
lege Savings Bank, and Garrett, the Court struck down the statutes be-
cause they swept too broadly in relation to the constitutional violation 
that Congress was assertedly enforcing, prohibiting too much state 
conduct that was in fact constitutional without a showing that states 
were engaging in significant amounts of unconstitutional conduct.239 
In two of the modern cases, the Court contrasted the statutes at issue 
with provisions of the Voting Rights Act that were upheld because of 
their limited scope in South Carolina v. Katzenbach.240 These modern 
235 See supra note 133 and accompanying text. 
236 See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 82-91 (2000) (applying the "con-
gruence and proportionality" test, followed by a consideration of whether Congress found 
the existence of a more serious constitutional problem than perceived by the Court). 
237 See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650, 651 (1996) (laying out general 
principles for evaluating the appropriateness of legislation justified under Section 5). 
238 See Post & Siegel, supra note 135, at 477 (finding parallels between the Court's re-
cent Section 5 jurisprudence and strict scrutiny). 
239 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
240 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 967 (2001); City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 532-33 (1997). The City of Boerne Court wrote: 
This is not to say, of course, that § 5 legislation requires termination dates, 
geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates. Where, however, a congres-
sional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional state action in an effort 
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cases stand in stark contrast to the deferential standard of review 
enunciated in Katzcnbach v. Morgan, which approached rational basis 
at least in form and perhaps also in application.241 
Is ENDA sufficiently closely related to unconstitutional sexual 
orientation-based employment discrimination so as to survive this 
test? In part the answer to this question must derive from the earlier 
question, whether the discrimination prohibited by ENDA can ever be 
considered constitutionally rational. If it cannot, that is, if such dis-
crimination is always so irrational as to violate the Equal Protection 
Clause, then there is perfect congruence between ENDA and the con-
stitutional violations Congress has the power to prevent under even 
the narrowest reading of Section 5.242 As discussed above, however, it 
is at least possible that the Court would read Romer sufficiently nar-
rowly (as a holding dictated by the unusually broad scope of Amend-
ment 2)243 and ENDA's prohibitions sufficiently broadly as to con-
clude that ENDA did not simply prohibit conduct the Court would 
itself consider violations of equal protection.244 Thus, this Article now 
considers ENDA as prophylactic legislation going beyond the actual 
equal protection guarantee and thereby subject to the congruence 
and proportionality test. 
to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state action, limitations of this kind 
tend to ensure Congress' means are proportionate to ends legitimate under 
§5. 
City o/Boerne, 521 u.s. at 533. 
241 See 384 U.S. at 653 ("It is not for us to review the congressional resolution of the 
factors [leading Congress to conclude that § 4 (e) of the Voting Rights Act was necessary to 
secure the equal protection rights of Puerto Ricans in the United States]. It is enough that 
we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it 
did. "). Morgan applied this same deferential standard to congressional determinations of 
the substance of the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Morgan court 
wrote: 
Here again, it is enough that we perceive a basis upon which Congress might 
predicate a judgment that the application of New York's English literacy re-
quirement to deny the right to vote to a person with a sixth grade education 
in Puerto Rican schools in which the language of instruction was other than 
English constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
See id. at 656. 
242 See supra note 155 and accompanying text. 
243 See supra note 164 and accompanying text. 
244 Compare Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 86-89 (2000) (describing the 
breadth of the ADEA and the narrowness of its exceptions as evidence of its lack of pro-
portionality compared with the relatively insignificant constitutional problem it sought to 
address). 
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Most of the ENDA limitations relevant to the congruence and 
proportionality inquiry have already been discussed above, in the dis-
cussion whether ENDA is limited to prohibiting constitutionally irra-
tional government employment discrimination.245 It should be un sur-
prising that the same factors are relevant to both inquiries: Even if 
ENDA's limitations do not exactly track the conduct that the Court 
would find unconstitutional, those limits would still support an argu-
ment that ENDA was carefully tailored so as to remain proportionate 
to the constitutional violations it sought to remedy. As noted above, 
the most important of these limits are the prohibition on disparate 
impact claims and on claims for spousal benefits for same-sex part-
ners. Also significant, if indirectly, are the exemptions for the military, 
religious organizations, and small employers. Taken together, these 
limits restrict ENDA's scope to situations that are quite arguably con-
sistently unconstitutional. But even if ENDA, so limited, continues to 
prohibit conduct the Court would find constitutional, these limits 
significantly restrict ENDA's scope and focus it much more closely on 
unconstitutional conduct. 
In addition to the limits discussed above, two other provisions of 
ENDA further limit its scope and are especially relevant to the con-
gruence and proportionality inquiry. First, ENDA explicitly refrains 
from handicapping employers' enforcement of general codes of sex-
ual conduct that are designed and implemented in a sexual orienta-
tion-neutral fashion. 246 This provision limits ENDA's scope byexempt-
ing situations where the employer might claim that the adverse 
employment action was based on sexual conduct, not sexual orienta-
tion. By allowing at least some sexual conduct to serve as the basis for 
an adverse employment action, the exemption goes some distance 
toward cabining ENDA to cases of pure orientation. This, in turn, 
keeps the statute responsive (or congruent) to the status/conduct dis-
tinction created by the combination of Romer and Hardwick. 
Obviously, this provision does not completely track the 
status/ conduct distinction: For a state employer to cite sexual mis-
conduct as the reason for an adverse employment decision, the mis-
conduct must be nonprivate and based on sexual orientation-neutral 
grounds. Thus, for example, ENDA would still prohibit a state from 
firing an employee because she had sex with her female partner in 
the privacy of their home. Indeed, ENDA also would still prohibit a 
245 See supra notes 222-234 and accompanying text. 
246 See, e.g., S. 1276, 106th Congo § 11 (1999). 
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state from firing an employee because the state had a sodomy law re-
stricted to homosexual conduct, since the sexual conduct rule would 
not be orientation neutral. Thus, the sexual misconduct exemption 
does not give states complete freedom to cite conduct as the reason 
for the dismissal. For that reason, the exemption may limit states 
more than the Constitution (as interpreted in Hardwick) does.247 Still, 
the exemption serves to keep the statute focused on irrational status-
based discrimination and thus proportional to the underlying consti-
tutional violation. 
Second, ENDA prohibits affirmative action, quotas, or preferen-
tial treatment on the basis of sexual orientation, whether imposed by 
an employer or a court as part of an order or consent decree.248 While 
this provision may be a politically savvy response to the argument that 
anti~iscrimination laws confer "special rights,"249 the legal effect of 
this provision is to prevent a well-meaning employer or court from 
responding to discrimination by ordering or implementing a remedy 
that outruns the original statutory violation.25o Thus, not only are 
ENDA's limits closely tied to the prohibitions of the Equal Protection 
Clause, but in turn, implementation of those limits is closely tied to 
what the statute requires and goes no further. 
In sum, several arguments converge to present a plausible argu-
ment that ENDA survives the congruence and proportionality test. 
First, much garden-variety sexual orientation-based employment dis-
crimination has to be considered irrational. Second, ENDA limits its 
prohibitions to those instances where there is purposeful discrimina-
tion against homosexuals and thus a greater likelihood of unconstitu-
tional animus. Third, ENDA limits its scope when it confronts areas 
where either the state has a potentially legitimate interest (such as 
"protecting" heterosexual marriage or discouraging certain conduct) 
or, more indirectly relevant, where private parties may have constitu-
tionally cognizable countervailing interests. Fourth, the statute pro-
247 Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S 186, 196 (1986) (approving of morality as a 
legitimate reason to ban homosexual sodomy). 
248 See, e.g., S. 1276, 106th Congo § 12(d) (1999) (affirmative action prohibition); S. 
1276, 106th Congo § 8 (1999) (quota and preferential treatment prohibitions). 
248 See, e.g., EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS 102-10 (1999) (dis-
cussing polling data from Colorado in the period leading up to the vote on Amendment 
2). 
250 Normally, courts' equitable power is broad-ranging and includes the power to enter 
and monitor compliance with consent decrees that require the parties to do more than 
what the underlying law requires. See, e.g., Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 
367,389 (1992). 
2002] Section 5 of the Fuurteenth Amendment and ENDA 45 
hibits employer or judicial remedies from outrunning the underlying 
constitutional violation. If a statute may be congruent to constitu-
tional violations in an area the Court itself has not heavily involved 
itself in, ENDA seems to be it. 
2. Have States Engaged in a Pattern and Practice of Unconstitutional 
Employment Discrimination Against Gays and Lesbians? 
In determining whether a pattern and practice of conduct exists, 
thus making remedial or prophylactic legislation appropriate Section 
5 legislation, the current doctrine demands (1) a pattern of (2) rele-
vant (3) unconstitutional conduct (4) by states.251 In this case, the un-
constitutional conduct would be state government sexual orientation-
based employment discrimination that is unconstitutionally irrational. 
Garrett provides the clearest guidance on what the Court might de-
mand. In Garrett, the Court acknowledged the finding in the ADA that 
discrimination on the basis of disability "continue[s] to be a serious 
and pervasive social problem "252 and conceded that that conclusion 
was supported by evidence assembled by Congress.253 However, the 
Court refused to consider such findings and evidence relevant, since 
the "great majority" of the incidents cited in the record did not in-
volve states.254 Having limited the field of inquiry to examples of con-
duct engaged in by state governments, the Court then further limited 
the field to examples of conduct by state governments in the field of 
employment.255 Rejecting Justice Breyer's compilation of state dis-
criminatory conduct against the disabled, the Court stated that "only 
a small fraction" of the incidents Justice Breyer cited dealt with em-
ployment.256 According to the Court, "the overwhelming majority" of 
those incidents alleged discrimination by states in the provision of 
public services and public accommodations, areas addressed by other 
parts of the ADA not challenged in Garrett.257 Finally, the Court ques-
tioned whether the examples provided of state government employ-
251 See Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 965 (2001) (restricting 
the appropriate field of inquiry to conduct by states, not including units of local govern-
ments such as cities or counties). 
252Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2) (1994». 
253 See id. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. 
256 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 965 n.7. 
257 See id. 
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ment discrimination reflected unconstitutional conduct on the states' 
part. 258 
Mter Garrett, then, plaintiffs (and Congress) face a difficult task 
of compiling a detailed record including examples of the specific vio-
lations the statute seeks to remedy. The question, then, is whether the 
phenomenon of sexual orientation-based employment discrimination 
is easily susceptible to the compilation of such a record. 
The normal way of developing any legislative record would be for 
Congress to look at the issue, seek out evidence, and find facts based 
on the evidence it examined. In the case of discrimination, though, 
the possibility always exists that such an examination will not reveal 
the true extent of the problem. Indeed, the Court's Section 5 juris-
prudence recognizes this difficulty. Proof problems not only lay be-
hind the Court's willingness to allow Congress, under Section 5, to 
prohibit more conduct than required by Section 1259 but also help ex-
plain the Morgan Court's overall deference to legislative judgments 
regarding the need for particular restrictions on state conduct in or-
der to guarantee Fourteenth Amendment rights.260 
It is important to distinguish between these two versions of the 
proof problem. In Kimel, for example, the Court reaffirmed the con-
cept enunciated in City of Rome v. United States that Congress had the 
power under Section 5 "to remedy and to deter violation of rights 
guaranteed [by the Fourteenth Amendment] by prohibiting a some-
what broader swath of conduct, including that which is not itself for-
bidden by the Amendment's text. "261 In order to use Section 5 to en-
act such broader prohibitions, however, the Kimel Court insisted that 
there be a record of a problem that demanded such a broad remedy 
and concluded that Congress had created no such record.262 By con-
trast, the Court in City of Rome reiterated earlier cases' conclusions 
258 See id. at 964-65, 966. 
259 See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 176 (1980); see also Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 
at 963; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 
U.S. 507, 536 (1997); if. supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting Professor Tribe's 
comparison of the City of Rome "wider net" theory to a rule of evidence). 
260 See Kime~ 528 U.S. at 81 ("'It is for Congress in the first instance to 'determin[e] 
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth 
Amendment,' and its conclusions are entitled to much deference.'") (quoting City of 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 536 (in turn quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966»); 
Morgan, 384 U.S. at 651 (Section 5 "is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing 
Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed 
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment."). 
261 528 U.S. at 81. 
262 See id. at 88-91. 
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that the Voting Rights Act was justified by legislative factfinding about 
southern states' attempts to infringe on African-Americans' voting 
rights.263 These proof problems come together, though, when consid-
ering the appropriateness of prophylactic legislation: If a discrimina-
tion problem requires a broad remedy because the discrimination is 
easy to disguise, it might well be that Congress will have a similarly 
difficult time uncovering the problem and creating an airtight record 
of its existence. In such a situation, the Court would be faced with the 
choice of deferring to Congress' determination (perhaps without 
overwhelming evidentiary support) that a problem existed or allow-
ing the very insidiousness of the problem to serve as a shield from 
remedial legislation. 
In the case of age- or disability-based discrimination it is easy to 
imagine the problem. Such discrimination can be veiled under non-
objectionable criteria such as merit or efficiency, thus making the ac-
tual violation hard to spot and broader remedial rules acceptable. 
The problem is magnified if we take a broader view of the harm 
caused by such discrimination. If that discrimination not only harms 
those who actually are employed or apply for employment, but also 
deters many people from seeking work, then the extent of the dis-
crimination may well touch individuals well-hidden from congres-
sional investigation, not to mention as a practical matter unable to sue 
to enforce their right to equal treatment.264 In such cases, the best 
factfinding that could be expected would yield only a rough under-
265 See 446 U.S. at 174. 
264 For example, there would be a serious question whether someone deterred from 
seeking work because of suspected discrimination by the would-be employer would have 
standing to sue in federal court given the relatively strict causal links required for a plain-
tiff to have standing. Compare, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 504, 505 (1975) (denying 
standing to would-be residents of a township alleged to have engaged in discriminatory 
zoning on the ground that it was unclear whether the zoning decisions had in fact caused 
home builders to not build the low-cost housing the plaintiffs could afford). This is not an 
insurmountable hurdle, however. For example, in Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 
200 (1995), the Court allowed a white-owned contractor to challenge a government set-
aside policy and seek forward-looking relief without requiring it to prove that it would be 
the low bidder. Instead, the Court characterized the injury as impacting the plaintiff's 
ability to compete on equal footing with other contractors, regardless of whether plaintiff 
could show that it would have been successful in that competition. So too in the example 
in the text, a plaintiff discouraged from applying for work might be able to argue that she 
was deprived of her ability to compete fairly for a job, even though it was unknowable 
whether she would in fact have gotten the job had she applied and had the employer not 
discriminated. Still, the Adarand example enjoys a tighter causal link, if for no other reason 
than because the contractor in that case had bid on construction jobs before, and thus it 
could be presumed that the contractor would do so again. 
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standing of the scope of the problem based on unreliable and impre-
cise mechanisms such as surveys (for example, "if you knew that you 
wouldn't be discriminated against because of your agel disability, 
would you seek work?").265 Nevertheless, the Court in Garrett did not 
seem moved by these difficulties confronting Congress. In the face of 
a congressional finding of overall societal discrimination against the 
disabled266 and the presentation of a large number of instances of 
their disparate treatment,267 the Court nevertheless faulted Congress 
for failing to provide specific examples of conduct by states,268 relating 
to employment discrimination,269 that constituted unconstitutional 
conduct. 270 
This evidentiary problem may be even more severe in the context 
of sexual orientation discrimination. What makes sexual orientation 
different from age or disability-or almost any other objectionable 
criterion for discriminating-is that sexual orientation can be hidden. 
It may be practically impossible for blacks to hide their race, for 
women to hide their gender, for the elderly to hide their age, or for 
the disabled to hide their disability, but it is not only possible, but in 
many situations the norm for gays and lesbians to hide their sexual 
orientation.271 That fact makes it all the more difficult to compile a 
reliable record of sexual orientation discrimination, especially in the 
workplace, where it is normally relatively easy for a lesbian to hide her 
orientation, and apparently quite common.272 While, for example, a 
heterosexual woman would not be "coming out" if she complained 
about discriminatory treatment, a lesbian might well be, and thus 
would bear an extra burden in disclosing the discrimination, whether 
265 Indeed, to the extent that such indirect methods are necessary in order to ascertain 
the existence of discrimination, congressional (as opposed to judicial) action may be 
called for, since in such situations it may be difficult to structure a legal claim that meets 
the requisites of an Article III case or controversy. Compare, e.g., Warth, 422 u.s. at 508 (de-
nying standing to plaintiffs on the ground that the causal chain between the defendants' 
actions and the plaintiffs' injuries was too speculative). 
266 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (2) (1994); see al50Bd. ofTr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 
121 S. Ct. 955, 966 (2001) (quoting this finding). 
267 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 977-93 (Appendix C to opinion of Breyer,j., dissenting); see 
also id. at 966 (responding to Appendix C). 
268 See id. at 965. 
269 See id. at 966 n.7. 
270 See id. at 965-67. 
271 A Philadelphia survey found that 76% of gay men and 81 % of lesbians said they 
concealed their sexual orientation in their workplace. SeeJAMEs D. WOODS &JAYH. LUCAS, 
THE CORPORATE CLOSET 8 (1993). 
272 See id. 
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to a government investigator, ajournalist, or her attorney.273 Nor, con-
trary to Justice Kennedy's suggestion in his Garrett concurrence, 
would prior litigation patterns necessarily reveal the existence or 
scope of the problem if the offending conduct resulted "only" in a gay 
person remaining closeted at work. 274 Indeed, since only one or two 
overt acts of discrimination might suffice to keep all gays at that 
workplace closeted, the scope of the problem might substantially ex-
ceed the amount of any litigation.275 
Moreover, forcing a gay man or lesbian to stay in the closet at 
work-on pain of official action such as firing or demotion or 
unofficial action such as harassment or threatened or actual violence-
could very easily be considered discriminatory in itself, to the extent 
that the workplace tolerates statements of, or openness about, hetero-
sexual orientation.276 Of course, it would be even harder for Congress 
to construct a record of that kind of evidence, at least in the sense re-
quired by the Court up to now-that is, with actual examples of indi-
vidual violations in which there was a direct causal link between the 
employer's conduct and the harm suffered by the employee.277 
Because of this hidden nature of the discrimination problem, 
there would be a stronger argument for deferring to legislative 
factfinding that was based not on explicit examples of wrongdoing 
(such as lawsuits or even complaints to EEOC-type offices) but instead 
on more aggregate studies that document this phenomenon in gen-
eral. And it is, of course, exactly that type of factfinding that courts 
273 Of course, this is not to minimize the difficulties faced by other groups, such as 
women, when they complain about discrimination. It is merely to point out that the option 
of the closet means that a lesbian's decision to complain imposes on her an additional 
burden not borne by others whose membership in the burdened group is already obvious 
to all. 
274 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 968 (Kennedy,]., concurring). 
275 The situation is different when there is discrimination by the employer, or harass-
ment by co-workers, on the basis of perceived sexual orientation. In that case, the victim 
has been "outed" (whether accurately or not, since the basis of the negative treatment is 
only a perception), and the closet has been taken away as an option. On the other hand, 
such punitive outings (whether accurate or not) might aggravate the closetedness of other 
employees, thus creating a larger problem, again hidden from the typical record·aeating 
methods the Court appears to favor in Section 5 cases. 
276 For example, Title VII prohibits discrimination under any terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1994). 
277 Presumably, such evidence would have to suggest the existence of an injury from 
having to stay in the closet, and some causal link between that injury and the need to stay 
in the closet at the workplace in particular. Whether such injury, assuming it can be 
identified, can be parceled out in terms of its causation is questionable, at least with the 
degree of precision the Court seems to have required in Garrett. 
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are incompetent to perform and where deference to the legislature is 
thus most appropriate. Whether the Court would be willing to credit 
such factfinding is unclear, given its recent insistence on actual exam-
ples of unconstitutional conduct performed by states.278 
In sum, then, litigants may well be able to demonstrate both 
ENDA's congruence and proportionality and the existence of the un-
derlying discrimination but only if courts recognize the breadth and 
inchoate nature of both discriminatory conduct and the harms there-
from. A fair test of ENDA as appropriate Section 5 legislation would 
also require courts to understand the uniqueness of discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. These difficulties require that Congress 
consider carefully its factfinding responsibility. The next Part of this 
Article evaluates the factfinding reflected in current versions of ENDA 
and offers suggestions for further investigation and findings of fact 
that the Court might find useful in its Section 5 inquiry. 
III. (UNSOLICITED) ADVICE TO CONGRESS 
The Court's new Section 5 jurisprudence clearly requires more 
from Congress in the way of proof. This requirement applies espe-
cially when the statute addresses an area the Court itself has not con-
sidered particularly problematic from an equal protection standpoint. 
City of Boerne v. Flores, Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank, Kimel v. 
Florida Board of Regents, and Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama 
v. Garrett all criticized the lack of evidence that states were engaging in 
widespread constitutional violations.279 Garrett also criticized the lack 
of actual legislative findings of such violations.28o Under these cases, 
then, drafters of ENDA should consider carefully both the findings 
ultimately made in the bill and their evidentiary support in the legis-
lative record. 
A. Documentation and Findings of Actual Government Bias Against Gays 
and Lesbians in Hiring 
An obvious place to start with legislative investigation is the exis-
tence and scope of state government employment bias against gays 
278 See, e.g., Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-66; Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 u.s. 62, 89-
91 (2000). 
279 See Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-966; Kime4 528 u.s. at 89-91; Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. ColI. Sav. Bank, 527 u.s. 627,644-47 (1999); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 u.s. 507, 530, 531 (1997). 
280 See 121 S. Ct. at 966. 
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and lesbians. This should not be surprising: Statutes justified under 
Section 5 must identify the unconstitutional conduct triggering con-
gressional action. Still, Garrett and the other recent Section 5 cases 
make this documentation task more challenging than under earlier 
cases such as Katzenbach v. Morgan, even assuming that Morgan would 
have required such evidence.281 
Several problems might arise with regard to Congress' documen-
tation of sexual orientation discrimination in the workplace. First, as 
noted earlier, the option of the closet makes documentation of actual 
workplace discrimination harder for sexual orientation claims, as op-
posed to claims based on other characteristics such as age or race.282 
Indeed, the pressure gays may feel to stay in the closet could itself be 
considered an aspect of workplace discrimination, an aspect which 
would be even more difficult to document. Thus, the Court's insis-
tence on the presentation of actual examples of unconstitutional 
conduct in numbers amounting to a pattern of such behavior by the 
states seems at first glance inappropriate to the inquiry with regard to 
sexual orientation. 
Still, the examples of intentional discrimination against gays and 
lesbians are, sadly, sufficiently numerous that a lengthy record of such 
conduct perpetrated by states could easily be compiled by Congress.283 
And since such intentional discrimination will so rarely be motivated 
by a reason sufficiently rational to satisty equal protection, most of the 
examples found will most likely quality as instances of unconstitu-
tional discrimination and thus directly support ENDA's validity. 
Second, while under City of Rnme v. United States government prac-
tices having a disparate impact might be viewed as justitying broader 
remedial legislation if Congress determines that such disparate im-
281 See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966) (stating that it was only neces-
sary for the Court to perceive a basis for the prophylactic action taken by Congress); see 
also City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 177 (1980) ("Congress could rationally 
have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a demonstrable his-
tory of intentional racial discrimination in voting create the risk of purposeful discrimina-
tion, it was proper to prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact.") (footnote 
omitted). Compare, e.g., Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 964-66 (requiring particularized findings of 
unconstitutional action by state governments). 
282 See supra notes 274-275 and accompanying text. 
283 A brief perusal of the Internet reveals several sites dedicated to documenting anti-
gay actions, including employment discrimination. See, e.g., Human Rights Campaign, 
Documenting Discrimination (documenting examples of private and public sector dis-
crimination, including employment discrimination, based on sexual orientation), at 
http://www.hrc.org/publications/pdf/DocumentingDiscrimination.pdf (last visited Nov. 
25,2001). 
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pact suggests the presence of intentional, invidious discrimination,284 
it might be harder to convince the Court that government actions 
having a disparate impact on gays hide an invidious intent. As noted 
earlier, ENDA disallows disparate impact claims.285 Nevertheless, 
findings of disparate impact could be useful to a court when consider-
ing ENDA's constitutionality, as they might suggest the existence of 
invidious discrimination. 
Still, the Court might have a problem with this latter approach. 
First, the possibility of a gay or lesbian employee remaining in the 
closet may lead the Court to wonder whether the asserted disparate 
impact actually exists. Of course, this is ironic: A homosexual's self-
infliction of the closet would cause the additional harm of casting 
doubt on the existence of the discrimination. Second, the Court may 
view homosexuality as more of a cultural phenomenon than, say, ra-
cial identity, with the result that the claimed disparate impact may be 
viewed not as a result of intentional discrimination but instead as a 
result of employment or career choices made by gays or lesbians.286 At 
any rate, these factors could easily be expected to hover in the back of 
the Court's mind, leading it perhaps to demand more before dispa-
rate impact would be seen as persuasive evidence of discriminatory 
intent. 
B. Documentation of the Relative Likelihood of Sex Crimes by Homosexuals 
and Heterosexuals 
This may sound like an odd subject with which Congress should 
concern itself. However, it may be something that is necessary, and 
certainly useful, in getting ENDA past the hurdle posed by Bowers v. 
Hardwick. Essentially, evidence that homosexuals engage in illegal 
sexual activity as much as heterosexuals would call into question the 
rationality of a state argument (or a court making the state's argu-
ment under the rational basis test) that employment discrimination 
based on sexual orientation is an appropriate way of ensuring that the 
284 See 446 U.S. at 177. 
285 See supra note 222 and accompanying text. 
286 Indeed, in the context of race, where the Court uses what is arguably a similar strict 
scrutiny standard, compare Post & Siegel, supra note 135, at 677, the Court discounted such 
disparate result data, wondering whether the data reflected not so much discrimination 
but instead career choices made by Mrican Americans. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson 
Co., 488 U.S. 469, 503 (1989). As in Croson, the Court might require Congress to make a 
stronger showing that the disparate result was attributable to discrimination and not to 
choices made by gays. See id. 
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state not hire persons likely to violate the law. This sort of factfinding, 
for which there is empirical evidence in the social science literature,287 
is the sort most likely to be accepted by the Court. It deals with social 
reality, not legal concepts that might lead the Court to suspect that 
Congress was attempting to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment.288 
Moreover, its social science/empirical basis makes it the type of issue 
where Congress' competence is most pronounced, relative to the 
Court's. 
A problem with this analysis is the existence of sodomy statutes 
that restrict only same-sex conduct. Currently, six states maintain sod-
omy statutes that apply only to same-sex conduct.289 This fact raises 
the specter of a court questioning Congress' finding, since, at least in 
those states, only same-sex sodomy is a crime. This raises an interest-
ing, potentially circular argument: Gays and lesbians can be discrimi-
nated against in the workplace because they are more likely to com-
mit sex crimes, and they are more likely to commit sex crimes because 
some sex crime statutes are targeted at same-sex conduct. Once again, 
Hardwick intrudes into the equal protection argument due to the 
complex relationship between conduct and status. However, there is 
at least reason to wonder whether sodomy statutes confined to same-
sex conduct remain viable after Romer v. Evans. Moreover, this prob-
lem becomes less pressing as the number of states with sodomy laws 
falls, as those laws are either repealed or struck down under state con-
stitutional principles.290 
287 See Booth, supra note 194, at 1260 (citing studies); Captain John A. Carr, The Differ-
ence Between Can and Should: Able v. United States and the Continuing Debate About Homosex-
ual Conduct in the Military, 46 A.F. L. REv. 1, 7-8 nn.26-29 (1999) (same). 
288 An example of the latter type of finding that the Court might reject would be one, 
made perhaps in response to Flarida Prepaid, that states were depriving patent holders of 
property "without due process.~ See 527 U.S. 627, 641-43 (1999). Compare City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534-35 (1997) (rejecting what the Court considered Con-
gress'Congress's attempt to reinterpret the Free Exercise Clause under the guise of its 
enforcemen t power under Section 5). 
289 See Tony Varona, Equal Justice: Federal and State Courts Continue to Shape Lesbian and 
Gay Equal Rights, HRC Q., Spring 1999,available at http://www.hrc.org/publications/hrcq/ 
hrcq99sp/pgI7.asp (last visited Nov. 25, 2001). 
290 See id. (noting that courts in four states have recently invalidated their sodomy 
laws); see also, e.g., http://www.geocities.com/privacylaws/legal.htm (describing case law 
from numerous states where the courts have struck down the state's sodomy law as uncon-
stituional) . 
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C. The Irrationality of Sexual Orientation Discrimination 
Finally, it makes sense for Congress to discuss in its findings the 
irrationality of sexual orientation discrimination in government 
workplaces. Previous versions of ENDA have recited findings about 
the lack of a relationship between an individual's sexual orientation 
and his or her ability to contribute to the economic life of the na-
tion.291 Still, Kimel and especially Garrett suggest that the Court would 
not consider such a finding dispositive. In Kimel, the Court ignored 
the legislative findings that employers imposed "arbitrary" age limits 
on workers.292 Instead, the Court concluded, based on its own investi-
gation of the record, that Congress had not found sufficient instances 
of age discrimination that were so irrational as to violate equal pro tec-
tion.293 Kimel, however, does not fully resolve the question of the 
Court's response to Congress' findings, since in the ADEA the refer-
ence to "arbitrary" age limits may well have been to the simple draw-
ing of a bright line age cut-off rather than an age limit that was neces-
sarily "arbitrary" in the sense of being unreasonable or irrational. 
In Garrett, however, the Court faced somewhat more definite 
congressional findings about the irrationality of the type of discrimi-
nation being outlawed. In the ADA, Congress found the "continuing 
existence of unfair and unnecessary discrimination, "294 which cost the 
nation "billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from de-
pendency and nonproductivity. "295 Similarly, Congress found that in-
dividuals with disabilities "have been faced with restrictions ... result-
ing from stereo typic assumptions not truly indicative of the ability of 
such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society."296 Read 
broadly, these findings could be taken as legislative uncovering of a 
significant problem with disability-based discrimination that was irra-
tional in the sense of not being justified on a cost-benefit basis. In-
deed, the dissent in Garrett cited these findings in arguing that the 
ADA was an appropriate response to that problem.297 The majority, 
however, did not discuss these particular findings. Instead, it focused 
on the finding that Congress did not make, either in the statute or in 
291 See, e.g., S. 2238, 103d Congo § 2(a) (1) (1994). 
292 See 29 U.S.C. § 621 (a) (4), (a)(5) (1994); Kimel V. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 
88-91 (2000). 
293 See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88-9l. 
294 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (9) (1995) (emphasis added). 
295Id. § 12101 (a) (9) (emphasis added). 
296 Id. § 12101 (a) (7). 
297 See 121 S. Ct. 955, 971, 972 (2001) (Breyer,]., dissenting). 
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the committee reports on the bill: Namely, that states engaged in a 
pattern and practice of unconstitutional conduct298 with regard to the 
employment of disabled persons.299 
The Court's refusal to credit Congress' findings in the ADA sug-
gests several conclusions. First, and most obviously, legislative findings 
must be quite precise in order to satisfy the Court that the accompa-
nying prohibitions are valid Section 5 enactments. In particular, the 
findings must refer to states themselves (not just "society" or "employ-
ers"), and they must refer to irrational or unreasonable conduct. Sec-
ond, and more generally, the Garrett Court may have interpreted such 
findings as attempts by Congress to interpret the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the extent those findings purported to determine that 
discrimination against the disabled was often unconstitutionally irra-
tional. In that sense, the Court might have viewed these findings as 
analogous to RFRA: Just as RFRA was thought to have represented a 
congressional attempt to reinterpret the Free Exercise Clause, so too 
these findings might have been seen as attempts by Congress to per-
form the rational basis review the Court may have thought was its own 
domain. 
The first of these concerns-about the precision of Congress' 
findings-is easy enough to address in ENDA, assuming that empiri-
cal evidence exists allowing Congress to honestly make the finding. 
The second concern, however, raises a more theoretical and difficult 
question: To what extent may Congress cast as "findings" statements 
that have direct legal significance? For example, if Congress were to 
"find" that a particular government act (say, an affirmative action 
program) "was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling government 
interest," would the Court accept that "finding" or discount it as an 
obvious attempt to short-circuit the Court's role in performing judi-
cial review?3°O An analogy might be found in appellate review of lower 
298 See id. at 966 (noting the lack of a legislative finding of unconstitutional conduct by 
states); id. (noting that committee reports cited problems with employment discrimination 
in the private sector but did not mention government employment). 
299 See id. at 966 n.7 (stating that most of the examples of state government discrimina-
tion cited by the dissent did not involve employment, and those that did were described so 
generally as to make it impossible to know whether they constituted unconstitutional ac-
tion by the state) . 
300 Compare United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47 (1871) (striking down a law 
that, according to the Court, prescribed a "rule of decision" for the courts and thus in-
fringed on the judiciary's role), with Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429 
(1992). In Seattle Audubon, the Court upheld, against a Klein challenge, a law that "deter-
mined and directed" that U.S. Forest Service compliance with certain new requirements 
for managing federal forests "was adequate consideration for the purpose of meeting the 
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court factfindings. For example, one appellate court (dealing, ironi-
cally, with the question whether gays and lesbians constitute a suspect 
class) viewed the trial court's determination of that issue as a '''consti-
tutional fact'" that was supported by the trial court's "ultimate facts 
and interrelated applications of law, sociological judgments, [and] 
mixed questions of law and fact. "301 For that reason it reviewed de novo 
the trial court's finding. 302 Full explanations of the constitutional fact 
doctrine or the scope of the "clearly erroneous" standard governing 
appellate review of trial court fact findings are well beyond the scope 
of this Article.303 However, the analogy should be clear: To the extent 
the fact that is found (either by a trial court or Congress) starts to take 
on the character of a legal holding, appellate review (or, in the case of 
legislatively found facts, judicial review in general) may appropriately 
become less deferential. 
Regardless, Congress could probably avoid this problem with re-
gard to ENDA because it should be relatively easy to marshal socio-
logical and other social science data supporting the proposition that 
sexual orientation has no impact on the factors that are relevant to 
successful employment.304 The empirical nature of this finding makes 
it more likely that the Court would credit it as being within Congress' 
area of expertise and authority, as opposed to an attempt to engage in 
law-interpreting as the Court clearly suspected in City of Boerne. 305 Put 
another way, the empirical nature of the facts found leaves courts with 
the ultimate authority to decide how those facts affect the outcome of 
statutory requirements that are the basis of' certain pending lawsuits that the statute 
identified by name and docket number. Id. at 437, 439. On the difficulty of determining 
when legislative action of this sort intrudes into the judicial realm, see generally William D. 
Araiza, The Trouble With Robertson: Equal Protection, the Separation of Powers and the Line B~ 
tween Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 49 CATH. U. L. REv. 1055 (1999). 
301 Equal. Found. of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 1995). 
302 See id. 
303 See generally, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 
229 (1985). 
304 See, e.g., The Employment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA): Testimony Before the Senate 
Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, l05th Congo (1997) (statement of the American Psy-
chological Association, available at http://www.apa.org/ppo/issues/pendatest.html(ask-
ing "Are lesbians and gay men psychologically abnormal which would justify work place 
discrimination?" and answering ''No.'') (last visited Nov. 25, 2001). On the recent trend 
toward increased use of social science data in gay rights litigation, see generally Patricia J. 
Falk, The Prevalence of Social Science in Gay Rights Cases: The Synergistic Influences of Historical 
Context, Justificatory Citation, and Dissemination Efforts, 41 WAYNE L. REv. 1 (1994). 
305 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997) (describing the burdensome-
ness of the prohibitions RFRA imposed on states "to illustrate the substantive alteration [of 
the Court's earlier interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause] attempted by RFRA"). 
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a particular legal test, for example, whether a government action was 
motivated by a compelling interest or was so "irrational" as to violate 
the rational basis test of equal protection.306 
By contrast, one finding that the Court ignored in Garrett and, 
based on the above analysis, is likely to ignore in ENDA concerns the 
status of the benefited group as a suspect class. In the ADA, Congress 
"found" that the disabled had all the indicia of a suspect class: Accord-
ing to Congress, they were a "discrete and insular minority," "sub-
jected to a history of purposeful unequal treatment," and "relegated 
to a position of political powerlessness, based on characteristics that 
are beyond the control of such individuals and resulting from stereo-
typic assumptions not truly indicative of the ability of such individuals 
to participate in, and contribute to, society."307 These words could 
have come out of the Supreme Court itself (indeed, they have),308 
which may be the reason the Court thinks those determinations be-
long to it rather than to Congress.309 
The upshot, then, is that drafters of ENDA may wish to think 
about linking findings of the irrationality of sexual orientation-based 
employment discrimination to empirical evidence of sexual orienta-
tion's irrelevance to successful employment.310 Such evidence should 
306 Obviously, this is not a clean line. "Irrationality" could be found empirically, or it 
could be a legal conclusion. Thus, if Congress finds that sexual orientation discrimination 
in employment is "irrational," it might be taken as either a statement of empirical reality or 
as an attempt to pre-determine the Court's application of the rational basis test. Compare 
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128, 146-47 (1871) (striking down a statute because it pre-
scribed a "rule of decision" for the courts and thus intruded into the judiciary'S realm). 
Thus, as discussed in the accompanying text, how the Court ultimately reads such a fact 
finding may turn on the type of record evidence that supports it. 
307 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a)(7) (1994) ("[I]ndividuals with disabilities are a discrete 
and insular minority who have been faced with restrictions and limitations, subjected to a 
history of purposeful unequal treatment, and relegated to a position of political power-
lessness in our society, based on characteristics that are beyond the control of such indi-
viduals and resulting from stereotypic assumptions not truly indicative of the individual 
ability of such individuals to participate in, and contribute to, society."). 
308 See, e.g., Bowen v. Gillard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987) (noting the charateristics of 
suspect c1asses);Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (same); San Antonio 
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,26 (1973) (same). 
309 Compare Equal. Found. of Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 265 (6th Cir. 
1995). 
310 It might even be helpful, though it seems excessive, to focus this finding specifically 
on government employment. This further specificity may seem unnecessary; after all, gov-
ernment employment is not so different in character from employment in the private sec-
tor, and so the irrelevance of sexual orientation discrimination in employment in general 
should presumably apply to government employment. But given how much specificity the 
Court seems to demand, it may be prudent to provide a finding as narrowly tailored as 
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be presented and cited in the legislative history and the bill's findings 
themselves, not only because the Court now looks more closely at 
congressional findings in general,31l but because these findings may 
be construed as either empirical or partially legal due to their special 
nature.312 
IV. THOUGHTS ON THE COURT'S SECTION 5 JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT 
OF ENDA's POSSIBLE FATE 
The scope of the Section 5 power is a breathtakingly broad topic, 
involving issues of the separation of powers, judicial supremacy, fed-
eralism, and the scope of the individual liberties in both the Four-
teenth Amendment itself and, via incorporation, the Bill of Rights. 
For this reason, some humility may be called for when attempting to 
discern the proper scope of that power. This concluding part of the 
Article attempts to offer some modest insights into the Section 5 is-
sue. It proceeds from a proposition broadly accepted by the current 
Court: that RFRA was unconstitutional. It then considers why RFRA 
may have gone beyond Congress' Section 5 power and applies that 
tentative reasoning to federal laws justified as provisions enforcing the 
equal protection guarantee. It concludes by considering Congress' 
special role in identifying discrimination that society no longer con-
siders reasonable, including sexual orientation discrimination. 
A. A First Cut: Congress' Use of Legal Terms of Art 
In approaching the issue, it may help to start by thinking about 
the one case of those which this Article has discussed that did not 
produce a dissent on the Section 5 issue: City of Boerne v. Flores. 313 What 
was it about RFRA that allowed the Court, sharply divided on so many 
of the issues encompassed within the Section 5 issue, to forge some-
this. The same would go for record evidence supporting that finding. See infra text accom-
panying notes 311-312 . 
. 3ll Cf Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 969 (Breyer, j., dissenting) (comparing the Court's review 
of the congressional record "as if it were an administrative agency record"). See generally, 
e.g., Harold j. Krent, Turning Congress into an Agen0': The Propriety of Requiring Legislative 
Findings, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 731 (1996). 
312 See supra notes 300-306 and accompanying text. 
m Justices O'Connor, Souter, and Breyer all dissented, but Justice O'Connor agreed 
with the majority's analysis of the Section 5 issue, while Justices Souter and Breyer re-
frained from expressing an opinion, resting their positions on whether Smith was properly 
decided. See 521 U.S. 507, 545 (1997) (O'Connor,]., dissenting); id. at 565 (Souter,J., dis-
senting); id. at 566 (Breyer,j., dissenting). 
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thing of a consensus that RFRA was unconstitutional? One obvious 
characteristic of RFRA was that it used legal terms of art, namely, 
mandating that government not "substantially burden"314 a person's 
religious exercise unless the burden furthered "a compelling govern-
ment interest"315 and was "the least restrictive means"316 of furthering 
that interest. Initially, our intuition might be that there is something 
inappropriate about Congress' use of such "legal" terms. On 
reflection, though, that intuition reveals itself as incorrect. For exam-
ple, if Congress thought that any racial disparities in employment 
were an abomination that should be allowed only if absolutely neces-
sary, there would be nothing wrong with it using these terms in a stat-
ute mandating racial proportionality in every workplace in the coun-
try unless it was critical that a disparity be maintained. Indeed, using 
these terms brings the clarity of a common language: Congress knows 
what those terms mean to the courts, and the courts know that Con-
gress knows, with the result that there is increased predictability and 
accuracy in the dialogue between the judiciary and the legislature. 
B. A Second Cut: Judicial Supremacy 
A more subtle version of our initial intuition might revolve 
around the kind of issue on which Congress was legislating. On this 
view, RFRA's problem was that it used these legal terms in an area sub-
ject to the courts' ultimate authority: the meaning of the Constitution. 
The sequences of events leading to City of Boerne suggests the problem. 
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith, the Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause so as to subject 
government action burdening religion to less stringent scrutiny than 
the compelling government interest test that had prevailed since Sher-
bert v. Verner.317 In RFRA, Congress sought to overturn Smith and rein-
state a version of the Sherbert test.318 In turn, City of Boerne struck RFRA 
down as exceeding Congress' power to "enforce" the free exercise 
guarantee.319 
314 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l (a) (1994). 
m [d. § 2000bb-l (b) (1). 
316 [d. § 2000bb-l (b) (2). 
317 See generally Employment Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 
872 (1990). 
318 See supra note 73 and accompanying text (noting the Court's statement in City of 
Boerne that RFRA actually wen t beyond the Sherbert test) . 
319 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997). 
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On the other hand, commentators have argued that this sort of 
legislative disapproval of a constitutional law standard is unexcep-
tional and not troubling, at least when the legislative response in-
creases, rather than limits, the scope of the right.32o The existence of a 
tradition of such legislative expansions of rights321 provides a trou-
bling response to the argument that fundamental separation of pow-
ers principles, informed by statements of judicial power such as Mar-
bury v. Madison322 and Cooper v. Aaron,323 flatly foreclose any role for 
Congress in interpreting the Constitution. 
Further concerns arise when one considers the difference most 
commentators perceive324 between Katzenbach v. Morgan's two ration-
ales for upholding the Voting Rights Act provisions challenged in that 
case: First, the theory that Congress may have been seeking to protect 
the rights of Puerto Ricans to equal attention from government, 
which, in Congress' view, could best be achieved by ensuring their vot-
ing rights; and, second, the theory that Congress could have deter-
mined for itself that the inequality suffered by Puerto Ricans consti-
tuted invidious discrimination and was thus itself unconstitutional. As 
the City of Boerne Court conceded, though, "the line between measures 
that remedy or prevent unconstitutional action and measures that 
make substantive changes in the governing law is not easy to dis-
cern. "325 Indeed, Morgan's discussion of this second rationale referred 
to Congress' institutional competence,326 an interesting observation 
in light of the congressional law-interpreting function that that ra-
tionale is thought to embrace. 
520 See, e.g., Vergeer, supra note 60, at 671-79 (providing examples of legislative rever-
sals of Supreme Court decisions enunciating constitutional doctrine). Professor Vergeer 
also cites one example of a statute restricting a right found by the Court: The law Congress 
enacted in the aftermath of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), reinstating a more 
flexible standard for judging the voluntariness of a confession. See Vergeer, supra, at 674. 
The viability of the idea that Congress can restrict a Court-found constitutional right as 
easily as it can expand one is now in doubt after Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 
(2000), in which the Court held that Miranda's confession rule was constitutionally based 
and could not be overruled by a legislative act. 
321 See supra note 320 and accompanying text. 
322 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137,177 (1803). 
523 358 U.S. 1, 17 (1958) (suggesting that the Supreme Court's exposition of the Con-
stitution is itself the law of the land). 
324 For a notable exception, see Vergeer, supra note 60, at 693-96 (arguing that these 
two differences are more the product of post-Morgan commentary than the text or reason-
ing of the opinion itself). 
325 521 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1997). See generally Araiza, supra note 300 (discussing an 
analogous line-drawing difficulty in the context of normal statutes). 
526 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966). 
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C. A Third Cut: The Nature of the Equal Protection Guarantee 
A third cut at our intuition, informed by our progress so far, 
should also focus on the kind of issue on which Congress was legislat-
ing but from a slightly different perspective. This approach focuses on 
the type of constitutional right Congress is attempting to affect 
through its Section 5 power. The key distinction here is between equal 
protection rights and other rights found in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. 
Equal protection is an enormously powerful tool. In contrast to 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and Immunities Clause, 
which simply protects certain fundamental interests (interpreted 
quite narrowly since the Slaughter-House Cases) ,327 and the Due Process 
Clause, which protects only life, liberty, and property interests,328 the 
Equal Protection Clause prohibits any government action that dis-
criminates invidiously, regardless of the importance of the interest.329 
Thus, the military'S eligibility rules for dependents' benefits,330 a city's 
distribution of contracting business,331 its regulation of advertising on 
trucks,332 and even its singling out of an individual homeowner with 
regard to utility connections333 all raise equal protection concerns. 
While the other Fourteenth Amendment guarantees demarcate par-
ticular freedoms or interests government cannot intrude on, equal 
protection is a broad command of equal, or fair, treatment across 
every sphere of government action.334 
The breadth of the equal protection guarantee suggests that 
Congress should have broader discretion to "enforce" it compared 
with other Fourteenth Amendment rights. At base this might have to 
do with the character of the rights guaranteed. Concepts such as "lib-
327 See generally 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
328 Compare, e.g., Coli. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 
U.S. 666, 671-75 (1999) (refusing to consider a business' interest in its competitor not 
engaging in false advertising as a due process-protected "property" interest). 
329 It should be noted that there is a strand of equal protection jurisprudence that fo-
cuses on the importance of the benefit or burden that is being distributed unequally. See 
generally, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (right to vote). This Article focuses 
instead on the main component of equal protection jurisprudence, which, in turn, focuses 
on the identity of the group being burdened as opposed to this "fundamental rights" 
strand. 
330 See generally Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
331 See generally City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
332 See generally Ry. Express Agencyv. People of State ofN.Y, 336 U.S. lO6 (1949). 
333 See Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 566 (2000) (allowing assertion of 
equal protection claim by a class of one). 
334 See supra note 329 and accompanying text. 
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erty interests," "cruel and unusual punishment," or "free exercise of 
religion" have as much legal as empirical meaning. For example, as 
laypersons we might call many things "cruel" that the Court would not 
consider "cruel and unusual. "335 By contrast, the constitutional re-
quirement of equal or fair treatment may be more readily compre-
hensible as a non-legal matter. In other words, whatever one might 
think about the reasonableness of a distinction between a lay person's 
understanding of "cruelty" and what the Court considers "cruel and 
unusual punishment," it is surely much more difficult to justify a dif-
ference between lay and legal understandings of fairness or equality. 
Indeed, this difference is suggested by the very vacuousness of the 
term "equal protection" (vacuous since all legislation classifies) and 
the strong pull political process theory has had in the equal protec-
tion area, both of which suggest that an inherently legal, or special-
ized, definition of equality simply does not exist.336 To be blunt: 
"Cruel and unusual punishment" may be a term of art; "equality" is 
much less so. 
In turn, equality's less specialized meaning potentially justifies a 
wider berth for legislative assistance in informing the Equal Protec-
tion Clause. Thus, while the City of Boerne Court might have been 
justified in considering RFRA an illegitimate congressional usurpation 
of the Court's power to interpret the Constitution, there may be less 
reason for the Court to reject congressional attempts to give meaning 
to the Equal Protection Clause's promise of equality. Congress might 
not be able to create a privilege or immunity or expand the meaning 
of free religious expression,337 but Congress still might be able to de-
535 It should be noted, though, that often the Court will essentially ask what "we" think 
about these terms when it decides their meanings. See generally, e.g., Thompson v. Okla-
homa, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited the execution of a person who was fifteen years old when he committed a capital 
crime in large part because of a societal consensus against executions of persons that 
young). 
836 Political process theory is normally thought to have originated in the famous Foot-
note 4 of United States v. Carotene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), and to have been 
most fully expanded into a theory by John Hart Ely. See generally JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980). Ironically, Carotene Products was a 
substantive due process case; still, Footnote 4's focus on legislative classifications clearly 
suggested the theory's ultimate home in the Equal Protection Clause. 
887 See Marci A. Hamilton, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Letting the Fox into the 
Henhouse Under Cover of Section .5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 16 CARDOZO L. REv. 357, 387-
96 (1994) (arguing that Congress should be allowed less legislative leeway when altering 
the scope of a Bill of Rights provision incorporated against the states via the Due Process 
Clause as compared with the equal protection guarantee). On the other hand, Congress 
has wide latitude to create property and liberty interests, the deprivation of which requires 
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termine what constitutes invidious discrimination. Indeed, as noted 
above, Morgan s discussion of Congress' determination that the denial 
of voting rights to Puerto Ricans constituted invidious discrimination 
included a reference to congressional competence.338 More generally, 
Morgan cited a variety of issues or concerns that the Court concluded 
were for legislative assessment and weighing: 
[T] he risk or pervasiveness of the discrimination in govern-
mental services, the effectiveness of eliminating the state re-
striction on the right to vote as a means of dealing with the 
evil, the adequacy or availability of alternative remedies, and 
the nature and significance of the state interests that would 
be affected by the nullification of the English literacy re-
quirement as applied to residents who have successfully 
completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican schoo1.339 
The important point here is that these factors share a common-
sense basis in the amount of equality that is appropriate and feasible 
in a given context. The point is not that the existence of these factors 
requires a weighing of competing considerations; in general, balanc-
ing tests may well include factors that courts are uniquely qualified to 
judge given the existence of extrinsic aids to identify and consider 
those factors. 340 But what extrinsic aids govern the equality determina-
tion made in the statute upheld in Morgan? If there are none, or few, 
satisfaction of the guarantee of procedural due process. See, e.g., Fla. Prepaid Postsecon-
dary Educ. Expense Bd. v. ColI. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,642 (1999) (accepting the propo-
sition that Congress may create property interests and then, under Section 5, legislate 
against their deprivation without due process); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571, 
572 (1972) (explaining the theory behind legislative creation of property interests). In 
many ways, though, procedural due process is very different from its substantive cousin, 
with the former's rules deriving in large part from the different political dynamic at work 
when Congress grants or deprives a property interest to an entire class and when it author-
izes government bodies to take away such interests on a piecemeal basis. Compare Arnett v. 
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 152 (1974) (plurality opinion) (arguing that if Congress creates a 
property interest it should be able to attach it to a condition that its deprivation can be 
accomplished without a hearing), with id. at 164 (Powell,]., concurring in part and con-
curring in the judgment in part) and id. at 171 (White,]., dissenting) (both criticizing the 
plurality's theory); see also Araiza, supra note 300, at ll37 n.290. 
~38 See supra note 326 and accompanying text. 
339 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966). 
340 See, e.g., Commodities Futures Trading Corp. v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 853-57 (1986) 
(determining the legality of adjudications conducted by non-Article III federal tribunals 
based on a balancing of factors, including the character of the right adjudicated as public 
or private and the degree to which the non-Article III court exercises powers typically asso-
ciated with a court). 
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the argument should naturally follow that Congress' enforcement 
power should correspondingly expand. 
D. ENDA and Section 5 
Thus, the equal protection guarantee is broad and based on a 
constitutional principle that is less susceptible than most to legal de-
termination and reasoned explication. For these reasons, it is also 
fluid and especially susceptible to social change. Sexual orientation 
discrimination provides a striking example. What was once thought to 
be perfectly reasonable discrimination against "perverts" and, later, 
people with serious mental illness has come to be understood as in-
appropriate status-based discrimination, explainable, if at all, only as 
an expression of moral disapproval irrelevant to the conduct of "an 
almost limitless number of transactions and endeavors that constitute 
ordinary civic life in a free society. "341 
The fluidity of society's conceptions of appropriate and inappro-
priate classifications provides another reason for allowing the legisla-
ture a broader scope for enforcing the equal protection guarantee. 
This is especially the case with sexual orientation discrimination given 
the complexity of our attitudes toward sexuality and gender roles. Be-
cause understanding sexual orientation discrimination requires study 
and data gathering, and because equal protection may fundamentally 
be a matter of social consensus on what discrimination is appropriate 
or fair,342 Congress appears well suited to play a major role in deter-
mining the contours of the broad and majestic, yet vague, command 
of the Equal Protection Clause. 
There may be cause for concern if Congress defines those con-
tours too narrowly, so as to violate some judicially recognized floor of 
protection.343 But that is not an issue with ENDA. Instead, ENDA ap-
pears to be a classic example of Congress perceiving a new societal 
concern with a particular type of discrimination and targeting the 
broad command of the Equal Protection Clause toward its elimina-
tion. It does so narrowly, respecting interests (such as the right to as-
341 Romer v. Evans, 517 u.s. 620, 631 (1996). 
342 It bears repeating that political process theory attempts to provide meaning to the 
equal protection guarantee exactly by ensuring that all groups have a chance to influence 
how the legislature reads that consensus with judicial protection only for those who don't 
have that opportunity. See generally ELY, supra note 336. 
343 See supra note 23l. For a thorough analysis of Morgan's discussion of whether Con-
gress' power to interpret the Fourteenth Amendment includes a power to reduce protec-
tions previously found by the courts, see Vergeer, supra note 60, at 696-716. 
2002] Section 5 of the Fourteenth A mendment and ENDA 65 
sociation) that courts have recognized as constitutionally based. If 
Congress documents the problem of sexual orientation discrimina-
tion, the fact that courts have not themselves had significant occasion 
to consider the issue should not matter.344 To the extent that the Su-
preme Court's prior attitude should matter, though, the core concern 
in Romer v. Evans--that it is unconstitutional to burden a group for no 
relevant reason-finds a close reflection in ENDA's findings, prohibi-
tions, and exemptions. 
Under this analysis, ENDA should be found a valid expression of 
Congress' Section 5 power. 
344 CompareBd. ofTr. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955,968 (2001) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (identif)ing as a problem with the ADA the fact that few cases of al-
legedly unconstitutional disability discrimination had been litigated in federal court). 

